Abstract
In order to seek for causes and solutions of off-post behaviors of coal miners, static and evolutionary games were utilized on the basis of an established strategy simulation model between coal mine enterprise and coal miners. These games were used to determine the revenue matrix of two game parties given off-post behaviors of coal miners from two levels (coal miners and coal mine enterprise). Thus, equilibrium and dynamic evolutionary analyses of the two parties should be conducted. Results indicated that, in the enterprise’s perspective, inspection cost and punishment intensity are important factors that influence the safety production and economic benefit of coal mine enterprises; in the coal miners’ perspective, wage loss and the constraint degree it generates are essential factors. Furthermore, these factors constitute a key to solving off-post behaviors of coal miners. Reasonability of the established simulation model was analyzed and verified on the basis of off-post behaviors of workers from a coal mine that belongs to Yanzhou Coal Mining Co., Ltd. The coal mine enterprise should enhance the inspection of safety production and establish scientific and complete off-post punishment mechanism. Moreover, the coal mine enterprise should provide proper compensation, treatment, and reward policies of workers to reduce the off-post behaviors of workers from a coal mine enterprise effectively.
Highlights
Safe production and occupational health have constantly been the focus of attention in industrial development, especially in the coal industry with a high rate of accidents [1, 2]
Effective execution of the coal mine safety management system is analyzed from the perspective of system-related personnel to improve the safety management situation of the coal mine
Static and incomplete information dynamic game models are used to study whether coal mine enterprise and coal miners select the safety management system under different circumstances
Summary
Safe production and occupational health have constantly been the focus of attention in industrial development, especially in the coal industry with a high rate of accidents [1, 2]. Mahdevari et al [7] proposed an evaluation method based on fuzzy TOPSIS and addressed health and safety concerns of underground workers in a coal mine This method can support the formulation of coal mine management measures and provide a proper balance between different problems, such as coal mine safety and cost. Existing studies have indicated that many domestic and foreign scholars have emphasized the unsafe factors of coal mines, coal mine safety production plan, and health of coal miners These studies have explored only empirical statistics and analysis with strong subjectivity and have failed to realize an in-depth dynamic analysis of causes for off-post behaviors, including simulation studies of off-post behaviors of coal miners. From the angle of behavioral simulation, static and evolutionary game methods were adopted in this study to establish a game model between off-post behaviors of coal miners and enterprise safety inspection.
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