Abstract
Since the China Banking Regulatory Commission issued relevant policies on standardizing the credit card business of college students in 2009, college students' credit cards have gradually withdrawn from campus business. In recent years, with the rapid development of the Internet, Online campus loan began to take the college student market as the goal, and quickly entered the university campus through recruiting student cadres to carry out carpet promotion activities inside the campus. And seized the current situation of college students' lack of financial knowledge and the psychology of comparative consumption, the business volume expands rapidly. The subsequent malignant events, such as 10g naked slip, huge profits and fund-raising, college students jumping off buildings to commit suicide due to their inability to repay the loan, also have a negative impact on the society. In view of the above phenomena, this article combines existing research on existing problems of campus loans, and establishes an evolutionary game model between the campus online platform and college student borrowers from the perspective of evolutionary games. The game model has two stable points (1, 1), (0, 0), namely, the campus platform chooses to deceive the borrower, the borrower chooses to break the trust, and the campus platform chooses not to deceive the borrower, and the borrower keeps the trust. This paper discusses the influence of the changes of the relevant parameters in the model on the choice of the game strategy, and puts forward some suggestions to establish a two-way scoring mechanism for online lending, increase the financial knowledge reserve and income of college students, and help them establish a correct consumption view to standardize the campus online lending work.
Highlights
In recent years, with the increasing popularity of the Internet, college student consumer groups are more willing to choose online shopping to meet demand than stores
When the trustworthy borrower increases the reporting ratio λ of the campus loan platform with deceptive behavior, as the saddle point moves, the area converges to the area A in Figure 5 increases, and the area converges to the area B decreases; When λ decreases, as the saddle point moves, the area converges to region A in Figure 5 decreases, and the area converges to region B increases
This paper constructs an evolutionary game model between the campus network loan platform and the university student borrower based on the actual situation
Summary
With the increasing popularity of the Internet, college student consumer groups are more willing to choose online shopping to meet demand than stores. Some campus network loan platforms have seized the psychology of lacking financial knowledge and comparing consumption of college students. They use the publicity methods such as "low interest, fast payment, only need to provide student ID" to induce student loans to make huge profits. "Internet Loan House" conducted statistics on college student online loan data. It can be seen that the campus network loan, as a supplement to the national student loan, provides strong financial support for college students in low-income areas and plays a role of "helping the weak ". Chunmei Zheng [10] and others believe that there are still many problems in China's campus loans and establish a dynamic game of imperfect information between lending platforms and college students. Through the analysis of dynamic phase evolution map and related parameters, it provides effective suggestions for the healthy and stable operation of the campus loan platform
Sign-in/Register to view highlights & summary Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Free) 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a call
