Evolutionary dynamics of zero-determinant strategies in repeated multiplayer games

Abstract

Several studies have confirmed the existence of zero-determinant (ZD) strategies in repeated social dilemmas since Press and Dyson’s ingenious discovery of ZD strategies in iterated prisoner’s dilemmas. However, less research studies evolutionary performance of multiplayer ZD strategies, especially from a theoretical perspective. Here, we use a state-clustering method to theoretically analyze evolutionary dynamics of two representative ZD strategies: generous ZD strategies and extortionate ZD strategies. We consider two new settings for multiplayer ZD strategies: competitions with all ZD strategies and competitions with all memory-one strategies, apart from the competitions between these strategies and some classical ones. Moreover, we investigate the influence of the level of generosity and extortion on evolutionary dynamics of generous and extortionate ZD strategies, which was commonly ignored in previous studies. Theoretical results show that players with limited generosity are at an advantageous place and extortioners extorting more severely hold their ground more readily. Our results may provide new insights into better understanding evolutionary dynamics of ZD strategies in repeated multiplayer games.