Evolutionary Automata Networks: Henri Atlan’s Physical Theory of Intentionality

Abstract

ABSTRACT This article focuses on the project of a mechanistic and posthuman history of life as developed by one of the major figures of contemporary biological thought, the biophysicist and theorist of auto-organization Henri Atlan. In particular, it explores Atlan’s elaboration of this project in relation to the recent history of biological thought and in contrast to what he identifies as the phenomenological and humanist reduction of natural sciences. As this exploration develops, it shows that Atlan takes up a conception of language, qua natural language, as the analogical and differential code of his history of life. In doing so, it highlights two problems implicit in Atlan’s elaboration of his project: the demarcation of natural language from the artificial and metaphorical language of cultural discourses and the conception of properly called intentional auto-organization. Apropos of this second problem, it is argued that, despite Atlan’s aim of offering a physical theory of intentionality in general, including human and humanlike intentionality, his description of intentional auto-organization seems, in turn, to subscribe to what he designates as the phenomenological and humanist presupposition of sense-giving consciousness.