Abstract
We study the evolution of cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game where players are allowed to establish new interactions with others. By employing a simple coevolutionary rule entailing only two crucial parameters, we find that different selection criteria for the new interaction partners as well as their number vitally affect the outcome of the game. The resolution of the social dilemma is most probable if the selection favors more successful players and if their maximally attainable number is restricted. While the preferential selection of the best players promotes cooperation irrespective of game parametrization, the optimal number of new interactions depends somewhat on the temptation to defect. Our findings reveal that the “making of new friends” may be an important activity for the successful evolution of cooperation, but also that partners must be selected carefully and their number limited.
Highlights
Social dilemmas are situations in which the optimal decision for an individual is not optimal, or is even harmful, for the society as a whole
Resolving a social dilemma entails providing a rationale on how can behavior that is costly for an individual but beneficial for the society be maintained by means of natural selection? Achieving a satisfactory understanding of the evolution of cooperation in situations constituting a social dilemma is fundamental for elucidating and properly comprehending several key issues that humanity is faced with today, including sustainable management of environmental resources and warranting satisfactory social benefits for all involved, to name but a few
We have found that the resolution of the social dilemma, here modeled by the prisoner’s dilemma game, is most probable if the selection favors the more successful players and if the maximally attainable number of new links added to the population is restricted
Summary
Social dilemmas are situations in which the optimal decision for an individual is not optimal, or is even harmful, for the society as a whole. Achieving a satisfactory understanding of the evolution of cooperation in situations constituting a social dilemma is fundamental for elucidating and properly comprehending several key issues that humanity is faced with today, including sustainable management of environmental resources and warranting satisfactory social benefits for all involved, to name but a few. Evolutionary game theory has a long and very fruitful history when it comes to understanding the emergence and sustainability of cooperative behavior amongst selfish and unrelated individuals at different levels of organization. The prisoner’s dilemma game in particular is frequently employed for studying the evolution of cooperative behavior among selfish individuals. The dilemma is given by the fact that mutual cooperation yields the highest collective payoff, which is shared among the two players, individual defectors will do better if the opponent decides to cooperate. Instead of sharing the rewarding collective payoff received by mutual cooperation, they end up empty-handed
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