Evolution of cooperation in multigames on interdependent networks

Abstract

It is an arduous task to explore the internal mechanism of the widespread existence of cooperative behaviors in diverse biological systems. The influence of multigames and interdependent networks on the evolution of cooperation is multifaceted. In this work, we attempt to perform multigames on interdependent networks with different topologies and understand how cooperation evolves. In the model, the modulation of the sucker’s payoff makes each individual have an equal probability to engage in the prisoner’s dilemma and the snowdrift game. The basic composition of interdependent networks includes the Barabási–Albert scale-free network, the Erdös–Rényi random graph and the classical square lattice. Numerous simulations demonstrate that the evolution of cooperation is closely related to the topological structure of the sub-networks. For instance, the interdependent networks constructed by two square lattices favor the diffusion of cooperation, while the coupling between two Barabási–Albert scale-free networks inhibits cooperation. The internal evolutionary mechanism of cooperation is analyzed by conducting the multigames on the interdependent networks coupled by two square lattices. Furthermore, the simulations on the interdependent networks with heterogeneous sub-network topologies are also performed. Our research may be beneficial to stimulate further explorations of the spread of cooperation on multi-layer complex networks.