Abstract
The paper analyzes the evolution of strategy profiles in a population of finitely many players where each player interacts only with a subset of the population. Conditions are given which guarantee that the strategy profiles converge globally resp. locally to an equilibrium state. The results, derived by using methods from the theory of iterated discrete functions, are illustrated by several examples, e.g. coordination and hawk-dove games.
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