Event-triggered resilient control for cyber-physical systems under asynchronous DoS attacks

Abstract

In this paper, a novel event-triggered control strategy is proposed for cyber-physical systems (CPSs) with disturbance and measurement noise under two channels asynchronous denial-of-service (DoS) attacks. Two different event-triggering mechanisms for the sensor-to-controller (S-C) channel and controller-to-actuator (C-A) channel are designed, and the relationship amongst the event-triggering coefficients is obtained. Then sufficient conditions on the duration and frequency of the DoS attacks are proposed to guarantee the input-to-state stability of the closed-loop system under DoS attacks based on an observer-based control framework. In contrast to the existing studies where the synchronous DoS attacks on the S-C and C-A channels or attacks only on one channel are considered, the coupling problem for the two interconnected channels under asynchronous DoS attacks is solved. Furthermore, the condition for removing the restriction of the buffer size is obtained. Finally, a numerical simulation is given to illustrate the efficiency and the feasibility of the proposed strategy.