Abstract

Berserk resentment of the existing framework regulating the international investment protection system and the operating of investment tribunals have direct to a prevalent perception that there is an immediate need for reform. This is especially pronounced having to do with Investor-State dispute settlement (ISDS), where there is an overall perception that it is not anything but an unfair and unbiased arbitration system available to decide disputes between states and foreign investors. Therefore, ISDS has been obtained a reputation for being non-transparent, one-sided, and contradictory in all decisions made by ISDS tribunals. The European Union (EU) has responded to this need, by proposing an international investment court; in this research, an attempt is making to look at this court, according to the European Union’s proposal. Moreover, the research explores the potential in creating this international investment court since a system can be drastically altered. However, some criticism can be addressed by international investment courts. However, specific steps can be taken to improve the international community’s investor-state dispute settlement system by re-valuating all the objectives and goals to solve international investment disputes.

Highlights

  • Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) provisions have been for decades, an essential part of international investment agreements (IIAs) (Gaukrodger, D., & Gordon, K, 2012)

  • Identifying the necessitate for impartial, autonomous, and effective dispute resolution, IIAs respond to domestic shortcomings and give foreign investors the right to file a lawsuit before international arbitration (IA) against the host state for non-conformity with investment regulations

  • The analysis in this study would help expose permanent investment courts proposed by the European Union (EU) as not very efficient and a long-term solution, which plays its role in diverging from the ISDS’s original aims, which are considered highly essential for its success (ACERIS Law LLC, 2017)

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Summary

Introduction

Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) provisions have been for decades, an essential part of international investment agreements (IIAs) (Gaukrodger, D., & Gordon, K, 2012). Instead of the several ad-Hoc tribunals that were independently formed for each investment dispute, a permanent tribunal was introduced in the past as a reformation to overcome the huge wave of ISDS criticisms (Grisel, F., & Schultz, T, 2015) This idea rose on periodically occasions while negotiating the important mega-regional investment treaties, such as the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) between the European Union (EU) and Canada, the Transatlantic Trade, and Investment Partnership (TTIP) between EU and United States (US), and the TransPacific Partnership (TPP) (Schill, S, 2015). Independent forums, such as international investment tribunals, have been established to settle disputes for this practice to suit and fit into the features of the new universal economy It played an immensely significant role in establishing a middle ground between protecting state sovereignty and investor while selecting neither the host nor the investor-state as an arbitration site (Collins, D, 2016).

Proposed Permanent ISDS Mechanisms by European Union
The Main Criticisms to be Resolved by the Permanent Court
The Legitimacy Concern
Bypassing Domestic Courts to International Arbitration Tribunals
Tribunals Are Pro-Investors
ISDS Arbitrators are biased
The Threat of Litigation
The Consistency Concern
The Transparency Concern
Findings
Conclusion
Full Text
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