European Anti-Americanism and Choices for a European Defense Policy

Abstract

Since the end of World War II, a strong transatlantic partnership has been a cornerstone of Western geopolitical strategy. This does not mean that transatlantic relations have always been cordial. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was beset by periodic crises and disagreement throughout the Cold War and into the 1990s. Recent disagreements centered on the deployment of intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Europe during the 1980s, and on NATO involvement in the former Yugoslavia during the 1990s. In the immediate aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, NATO enjoyed a brief resurgence as its member nations voted unanimously to activate their mutual defense commitments under the North Atlantic Treaty (see Kaplan 2004). However, this was soon eclipsed by the subsequent dispute over U.S.-led military intervention in Iraq, the rancor rising out of which has struck such seasoned observers as Henry Kissinger and Colin Powell as being an order of magnitude worse than from past NATO crises (cited in Pond 2004, ix). Kaplan (2004, ix) describes it as a “near death” experience that threatened “to dissolve an entity that had survived over half a century.” Others argue that the alliance can and should be “saved” from a crisis that “need not be terminal to the political vitality of Atlanticism” (Hodge 2004, x). We suggest that this diplomatic crisis is doubled by a crisis in European confidence in the U.S. which may also be of unprecedented magnitude, and of some duration.