EU politicization beyond the Euro crisis: immigration crises and the politicization of free movement of people

Although, at the current state of development of the European Union (EU) legal order, EU citizenship is exclusively enjoyed by nationals of Member States, certain third-country nationals also benefit from some of the rights inherent to this status, mainly the right of free movement and residence. This chapter examines the rights, associated with EU citizenship, enjoyed by nationals from Norway, Iceland, Liechtenstein and Switzerland and compares the extent of these rights to those enjoyed by EU citizens. EU citizenship rights include the right to free movement and residence within the territory of Member States. It determines which legal basis of primary law allows the Union to conclude international agreements that extend the right of free movement to third-country nationals when the Treaty solely confers it to EU citizens. The chapter concludes that Norwegians, Icelanders, Liechtensteiners and Swiss indeed enjoy true rights of free movement and residence to the EU. Keywords: European Union (EU) citizenship; Member States; Norwegians; right of free movement; Switzerland; third-country nationals

ABSTRACTThe objective of this contribution is to account for the different political reform trajectories resulting from two of the most recent governance challenges faced by the European Union (EU), the so-called euro and refugee crises. While the euro crisis triggered various EU-level reforms, the refugee crisis has produced calls for policy and institutional reforms, most of which have – to date – not been adopted or implemented. We employ a liberal intergovernmentalist framework and show that differences in member states’ preferences in the two crises ensue from different exposures to negative externalities. Moreover, we attribute differences in EU member states’ willingness to engage in political reforms to variation in preference constellations among member states, producing different situation structures and bargaining dynamics. While the EU’s response to the euro crisis reflects a situation structure, which highlights both redistributive conflict and a demand for joint action, the response to the refugee crisis resembles a ‘Rambo’ game situation: the states least affected by migratory pressure were satisfied with the institutional status quo, and were thus able to leave the more affected states aggrieved.

The passport-free regime in Europe known as the Schengen Area is comprised of 26 of the 27 European Union (EU) member states plus Norway, Iceland, Switzerland, and Lichtenstein. Signed in 1995, the Schengen Agreement was intended to address the problem of enforcing borders between increasingly connected European countries and has expanded to include non-EU member states since then. This paper will lay out the arguments of those in favor of preserving the Schengen Area, who argue that the benefits of solidarity and free movement of people far outweigh the potential risks, as well as the most prominent criticisms of Schengen, including the perceived failures related to the 2015-2016 migration crisis, the 2015 terror attack in Paris, and the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. The succession of different crises faced by the EU in the last few years has highlighted the fact that the Schengen Agreement is a product of a different time, and that it is in need of reforms. Whether the Schengen Area can weather these challenges and adapt will have an impact on the future and functioning of the EU as a whole.

The impact of the COVID-19 outbreak is being endured throughout the world, and the European Union (EU) is no exception. The rapid spreading of the virus effected, among other things, restriction on the freedom of movement. The EU member states introduced national response measures to contain the pandemic and protect public health. While broadly similar, the measures differ with regard to strictness and the manner of introduction, reflecting the political legitimacy of the respective country. With the ‘Guidelines concerning the exercise of the free movement of workers during COVID-19 outbreak’ – its first COVID-19-related Communication – the European Commission (EC) attempted to curb differing practices of the EU member states and ensure a coordinated approach. Ultimately, this action was aimed at upholding of fundamental rights as guaranteed to EU citizens, one such being the freedom of movement. Thus, from the very start of the pandemic, the coordinated actions of EU institutions sought to contain the spread of COVID-19 infections with the support and cooperation of EU member states. This is confirmed by the most recent Council of the EU (Council) recommendation on a coordinated approach to restrictions to freedom of movement within the EU of October 2020. While they did prevent the spread of infection and save countless lives, the movement restriction measures and the resulting uncertainty have greatly affected the people, the society, and the economy, thereby demonstrating that they cannot remain in force for an extended period. This paper examines the measures introduced by EU member states and analyses the legal basis for introducing therewith limitations on human rights and market freedoms. To what extent are the EU and member states authorized to introduce restrictions on the freedom of movement in the interest of public health? Have the EU and member states breached their obligations regarding market freedoms and fundamental rights under the Treaty? And most importantly: have they endangered the fundamental rights of the citizens of the EU?

The Euro-crisis and the legal responses to it have profoundly changed the constitutional architecture of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) leading to the introduction of tighter budgetary rules, new mechanisms of financial stabilization and a comprehensive framework of economic adjustment for states in fiscal troubles. Yet, during the last years, the legal measures enacted by the European Union (EU) and the member states to respond to the crisis have increasingly fell prey to the scrutiny of courts, both at the national and supranational level. This paper provides a first comprehensive analysis of decisions by high courts in Estonia, France, Germany, Ireland, Portugal and the EU with the aim to discuss the role of the judiciary in fiscal affairs. The paper identifies a trend of increasing judicial involvement in EMU and explains it in light of the intergovernmental approach followed to respond to the Euro-crisis. As the paper argues, the choice of an intergovernmental management of the crisis, with frequent resort to international agreements outside the framework of EU law, has paradoxically produced greater judicialization than what would have occurred had the member states acted within the EU legal order. As the paper suggests, though, constitutional arguments related to expertise, voice and rights still plead in favor of letting the political branches take the lead in fiscal affairs. Hence, the paper concludes by indicating that future reforms of the EMU should be carried out through EU legislation – which is more legitimate in democratic terms (because of the political guarantees that surround law-making in the EU) and more secure in judicial terms (because of the more limited space for judicial overreach). Yet, the paper also underlines how the EU political process needs urgently to be reformed in order to improve its legitimacy and democracy.

The European Union (EU) is a complex and multi-faceted political and economic union that has experienced significant developments since its establishment in 1957 (European Union, 2021). A key challenge faced by the EU in its decision-making process is the issue of delay, which refers to the time lag between initiating a policy proposal and its final implementation (Börzel, 2013). This research paper provides a comprehensive analysis of the delay process within the EU, examining its causes, consequences, and potential solutions. By exploring the factors contributing to delays in EU decision-making, this study aims to illuminate the challenges the EU faces in overcoming these delays and effectively implementing policies (Hix, 2008). Through a critical examination of the impact of delay on the EU’s governance and its ability to address pressing issues, this paper contributes to the existing literature on EU governance and decision-making processes (Nugent, 2017). The EU has emerged as a significant player in global governance since its inception through the Treaty of Rome in 1957, now comprising 27 member states and numerous institutions across various policy areas (Bulmer & Paterson, 2013). Despite notable achievements, the EU faces a persistent challenge in its decision-making process: the issue of delay (Dür & Mateo, 2014). Delay, defined as the prolonged period between the initiation of a policy proposal and its final implementation, poses significant challenges to the efficiency and effectiveness of EU governance (Majone, 2009). The concept of delay within the EU’s decision-making process is multifaceted, influenced by various factors, including institutional complexities and diverging national interests (Checkel, 2014). A need for consensus among member states, often resulting in lengthy negotiations and compromises, is a primary driver of delays in EU decision-making (Kassim et al., 2015). The EU’s intricate institutional structure, featuring multiple bodies like the European Commission, the European Council, the European Parliament, and the Court of Justice of the European Union, adds layers of complexity to the decision-making process, further contributing to policy implementation delays (Sabel & Zeitlin, 2008). The consequences of delays in EU decision-making extend across numerous governance dimensions. Delays can diminish policy effectiveness, erode EU credibility, hinder timely responses to pressing issues, and result in a loss of competitive advantage (Falkner et al., 2015). Moreover, delays can exacerbate existing challenges and hinder the EU’s capacity to address complex issues, such as the Eurozone crisis, Brexit negotiations, migration policy, climate change initiatives, and digital transformation efforts (Ladi, 2012). To tackle the challenges posed by delay in EU decision-making, it is important to explore potential solutions that can enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of governance (Thatcher, 2012). Measures such as streamlining decision-making procedures, improving communication and coordination among institutions, strengthening leadership and accountability, addressing national interests, and promoting transparency and public engagement are pivotal steps toward overcoming delays and optimizing the decision-making process (Hix et al., 2007). By critically assessing the impact of delay on EU governance and its response to pressing issues, this research paper offers valuable insights into existing literature on EU governance and decision-making processes (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2005). Through a comprehensive analysis of the causes, consequences, and potential solutions to the delay process within the EU, this study provides a nuanced understanding of the challenges the EU faces and paves the way for more efficient and effective governance in the future.

Drawing on the new DEMIG VISA database which covers global bilateral travel regulations from 1973 to 2013, this paper explores patterns and trends in international travel visa regimes. The analysis challenge the idea of a growing global mobility divide between ‘North’ and ‘South’, yielding a more complex image reflecting the multi-polar and multi-layered nature of international relations. While predominantly European and North American OECD countries have maintained relatively high levels of entry visa restrictiveness for Africa and Asia, the latter regions have the highest levels of entry restrictions themselves. While citizens of wealthy (mainly OECD) countries generally enjoy greatest visa-free travel opportunities, this primarily reflects their freedom to travel to other OECD countries. Visa-free travel is mostly realised between geographically proximate countries of integrated regional blocs such as ECOWAS, the EU, GCC and MERCOSUR. Analyses of global dynamics in visa reciprocity show that 21 per cent of the country dyads have asymmetrical visa rules, but also show that levels of reciprocity have increased since the mid-1990s. Our analysis shows that visas are not ‘just’ instruments regulating entry of visitors and exit of citizens, but are manifestations of broader political economic trends and inequalities in international power relations.

Freedom of movement (FOM) in the European Union (EU) has become a highly salient issue in political and public debates. Most of the literature on FOM is heavily focused on the judiciary interpretation of this EU right, or on conflicting attitudes towards FOM within the national arena. However, the EU and its institutions as political actors that define and shape the content and meaning of FOM are largely absent from this literature. If mentioned, EU actors are often depicted as ideological and orthodox defenders of FOM. We argue that this perspective is empirically inaccurate, which leads to skewed theoretical assumptions. It not only overlooks an EU-level discourse on FOM that has changed significantly in recent years but also fails to acknowledge that even fundamental rights and key pillars of EU integration can be subject to discursive change at the EU level. A frame analysis of documents from the European Commission, the European Council, the Council of the EU and the European Parliament from 2004 to 2016 forms the basis of our argument. During this period, restrictionist arguments have increasingly entered EU actors’ discourse on FOM. Viewed almost as an absolute right of EU citizens during the 2000s, FOM during the 2010s has been framed in terms of the conditions underlying the exercise of this right. We conclude that EU actors are engaged in a political debate over what FOM means and that their discourse has shifted to support an increased conditionality of FOM.

Το βιβλίο διeρeυνά την eξέλιξη της eνοποίησης των Eυρωπαϊκών Κοινοτήτων από τη σκοπιά της οικονομικής ανάπτυξης. Ως οικονομική ανάπτυξη δeν ορίζeται απλά η μeγέθυνση του eισοδήματος αλλά η διeπιστημονική προσέγγιση της δημιουργίας eισοδήματος σe συνδυασμό μe την κοινωνική eυημeρία και τη θέση της ένωσης στον παγκόσμιο ιστό. Η διαδικασία της eυρωπαϊκής eνοποίησης eίναι κάτι μοναδικό στην παγκόσμια οικονομική ιστορία. Η eνοποίηση των Eυρωπαϊκών κρατών eίναι ένα πeίραμα ιδιαίτeρα καινοτόμο και μέχρι σήμeρα διαφορeτικό από όποια άλλη αντίστοιχη προσπάθeια έχeι eκδηλωθeί. Η eπιρροή και οι συνέπeιeς του eίναι τeράστιeς σe πολιτικό, κοινωνικό και οικονομικό eπίπeδο. Eίναι η πρώτη, σe μeγάλη κλίμακα, προσπάθeια οικeιοθeλούς μeταφοράς αρμοδιοτήτων eθνικής οικονομικής πολιτικής σe υπeρeθνικά όργανα και παρά τις μeταγeνέστeρeς πρωτοβουλίeς οικονομικής ολοκλήρωσης σe άλλeς ηπeίρους, παραμένeι η σημαντικότeρη. Έτσι, η μeλέτη της eξέλιξης της, αποτeλeί μια ιδιαίτeρη πρόκληση τόσο για τους οικονομολόγους, όσο και για τους Eυρωπαίους πολίτeς eυρύτeρα, γιατί eίναι απαραίτητο να καταλάβουμe αν η eνοποιητική πορeία ωφeλeί ή όχι την Eυρώπη ως σύνολο, το κάθe κράτος μέλος χωριστά, αλλά και την eπιρροή της σe τρίτeς χώρeς και στην παγκόσμια οικονομία. Η πρωτοτυπία του βιβλίου έγκeιται στην προσπάθeια συγκeρασμού τριών eπιπέδων: Το θeωρητικό υπόβαθρο κάθe πολιτικής για να διαπιστώσeι σe ποιο μέτρο η υπeρeθνική διαχeίριση παίρνeι υπόψη της την eξέλιξη της ακαδημαϊκής έρeυνας και προσπαθeί να κινηθeί μe ταχύτητα και γνώμονα τις διeθνeίς eξeλίξeις. Τη διακυβέρνηση και την eξέλιξη κάθe πολιτικής στα 60 πeρίπου χρόνια της eνοποιητικής διαδικασίας μe τη λογική ότι πολιτική (ακόμα και η οικονομική πολιτική) eίναι η τέχνη του eφικτού και έτσι μόνο μέρος της θeωρίας μπορeί να αποτeλέσeι συναινeτική βάση για πολιτικές αποφάσeις. Την αξιολόγηση των αποτeλeσμάτων κάθe πτυχής της Eυρωπαϊκής οικονομικής πολιτικής από τη σκοπιά των κοινοτικών οργάνων και την ακαδημαϊκή έρeυνα. Η γeνική ιδέα του βιβλίου eίναι να παρουσιαστeί η eμβάθυνση της eνοποίησης μέσα από κάθe πολιτική: η διαλeκτική ανάμeσα στις ρυθμιστικές παρeμβάσeις σe υπeρeθνικό ή eθνικό eπίπeδο eίναι η ουσία της eνοποίησης στη σημeρινή Eυρώπη. Η eνοποίηση του eυρωπαϊκού χώρου ξeκίνησe από έξι κράτη-μέλη και σταδιακά διeυρύνθηκe σe 28 κράτη-μέλη μέχρι το 2015. Συγχρόνως, ο βαθμός eνοποίησης πέρασe από μια ατeλή Κοινή Αγορά σe μια Ένωση μe αυξανόμeνeς υπeρeθνικές δικαιοδοσίeς, έστω και αν κάποιeς από αυτούς υπακούουν σe κανόνeς μeταβλητής γeωμeτρίας. Η σύσφιξη των σχέσeων, δηλαδή η αύξηση της δικαιοδοσίας της υπeρeθνικής παρέμβασης μe αντίστοιχη μeίωση των eθνικών βαθμών eλeυθeρίας, συνήθως αποφασίζeται και νομοθeτeίται σe πeριόδους οικονομικής μeγέθυνσης. Αντίθeτα, σe πeριόδους κρίσης, eπανeμφανίζονται φυγόκeντρeς τάσeις προστατeυτισμού και προσπάθeιeς eθνικών μέτρων για την αντιμeτώπιση της κρίσης, που ωστόσο δeν eίναι δυνατόν να υλοποιηθούν, eφόσον υπάρχeι κοινοτικό κeκτημένο, παρά μόνο αν η EE οδηγηθeί eπίσημα μe διάλυση ή τάσeις από-eνοποίησης. Οι πολίτeς και τα κράτη ζητούν συνeχώς τeκμήρια ότι η συμμeτοχή τους στην Eνωμένη Eυρώπη eίναι προς όφeλος τους και δeν eπιβαρύνονται πeρισσότeρο από όσο κeρδίζουν. Ωστόσο, μια τέτοια απόδeιξη eίναι πρακτικά αδύνατη, eφόσον δeν μπορeί να αποδeιχθeί ποιο θα ήταν το κόστος και ποιο το όφeλος eάν ζούσαμe σe έναν αλλιώτικο κόσμο. Έτσι, πότe μe τeκμηριωμένeς αναλύσeις, πότe μe διαίσθηση και πότe μe δογματισμό, δημιουργούνται θeτικοί ή αντίστοιχα αρνητικοί συνeιρμοί για την EE, μe αποτέλeσμα την αύξηση ή τη μeίωση των Eυρωπαϊστών και των Eυρωσκeπτικιστών αντίστοιχα. Έτσι, η eνοποίηση προχωράeι σταδιακά και eνίοτe δημιουργeί οξύνσeις ή ακόμα και οπισθοχωρήσeις. Σe πολλά σημeία αναγνωρίζeται θeωρητικά, αλλά και πολιτικά το (σχeτικό) κοινωνικό και οικονομικό προβάδισμα της Eυρώπης και σe αρκeτές πeριπτώσeις η θeτική συνeισφορά της eνοποίησης. Ωστόσο, η ένταση της κρίσης του 2009-2013, η ατeλής σύγκλιση, η πeριορισμένη κοινωνική συνοχή, η διαφοροποιημένη eικόνα της eξέλιξης της παραγωγικότητας και οι αργόσυρτeς διαδικασίeς λήψης αποφάσeων έχουν δημιουργήσeι αντίρροπές δυνάμeις και έντονη κριτική, που συνοψίζeται στους eξής τομeίς: Στο eσωτeρικό της EE δeν υπάρχeι πραγματική αλληλeγγύη, όπως φαίνeται τόσο από την αδυναμία συστηματικής σύγκλισης όσο και από την έλλeιψη κοινής δημοσιονομικής πολιτικής. Από πλeυράς ανταγωνιστικότητας η Eυρώπη σταδιακά χάνeι τα πλeονeκτήματα της και μeιώνeται η συμμeτοχή της στο διeθνές eμπόριο και στις άμeσeς ξένeς eπeνδύσeις. Ωστόσο υπάρχeι διχογνωμία για το κατά πόσο αυτό οφeίλeται σe αδυναμίeς της Eυρωπαϊκής πολιτικής ή απλώς στον δυναμισμό ορισμένων αναδυομένων χωρών. Στην διακυβέρνηση της Eυρώπης, που ξeκίνησe μe οραματιστές και σταδιακά eξeλίχθηκe σe έναν ιδιαίτeρα γραφeιοκρατικό οργανισμό. Η κριτική αυτή, που στοιχeιοθeτeίται από την έρeυνα των κοινωνικών eπιστημών, αλλά άλλοτe δικαίως και άλλοτe αδίκως, eνισχύeται από τον τύπο και τα πολιτικά κόμματα στην Eυρώπη, έχeι δημιουργήσeι αυξανόμeνα ρeύματα Eυρωσκeπτικισμού. Η Eυρώπη βρίσκeται αυτή τη στιγμή μπροστά σe μeγάλeς προκλήσeις και μeγάλα διλήμματα, ανάμeσα στις τάσeις παγκοσμιοποίησης της αγοράς και προσπάθeιας κρατών μeλών να διατηρήσουν eθνικές δικλeίδeς ασφαλeίας. Το βιβλίο αυτό δeν προσπαθeί να δώσeι λύσeις, αλλά να παραθέσeι μe τον καλύτeρο δυνατό τρόπο τα δeδομένα της οικονομικής πολιτικής, ώστe να διeυκολύνeι τον τρόπο σκέψης ως προς την αξιολόγηση της Eυρωπαϊκής ολοκλήρωσης και τις eκτιμήσeις για το μέλλον της.

The prolonged and ongoing series of European Union (EU) economic crises would appear to suggest that much of the research on EU politics and foreign policy is in urgent need of revision. This is particularly so regarding the external images of the EU. An understanding of changing perceptions may 'contribute in important ways to understandings, expectations and practices relating to the EU as a global actor' (Bretherton and Vogler, 2005, p. 43). It constitutes an important indicator for assessing if and how the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis has had a discernible impact on the EU's influence on the rest of the world — either close or far away from its borders. It is also a 'reality check' for the EU's own vision of its role as an international leader as well as of its status as a recognized power in an increasingly multipolar world. These two elements are linked as the EU's external image influences its self-image and thus the EU's behaviour as a global and regional actor. The EU's external images then become important indicators of how good intentions have been translated into observable actions (Rhodes, 1999). They also serve as sources of knowledge about European identity and the effectiveness of European common foreign policy. In sum, external views of the EU partly shape the EU's international identity and roles (Elgström and Smith, 2006), while the EU's institutional and policy reality is, in part, shaped in response to Others' expectations and reactions (Herrberg, 1997).

The EU Response to COVID-19: From Reactive Policies to Strategic Decision-Making.

The African Union (AU) is modeled after the European Union (EU). The EU's success and realization of intergovernmental and supranational integrations have been made possible by the various functions of its institutions that govern member-states. With the exception of a few hiccups (the euro-zone crisis), the EU is a unique project among other existing regional organizations because of its maturity and sophistication. The EU development represents a complex process stretching over a half century. It was-and-still is admired by many regional communities struggling to emulate and replicate the successes of the EU. Africa leads the way with her decade-long formation of the African Union (AU). This paper examines how the AU's institutions and visions resemble those of the EU; discusses the rationale, performance and challenges facing the AU. The EU-AU's new strategic partnership will be compared and analyzed to understand how Europe-Africa work together to realize intra-regional objectives and confronts pressing challenges facing leader of the two unions on areas of foreign policy, trade, economics and security missions. The article poses a few questions: Will the new AU resemble OAU's an autocratic club? What have been some of successes failures of the AU since its inception? Will the AU in the foreseeable future resemble the maturity and sophistication of the EU? Will some of the AU's institutions-the Pan-African Parliament, a court of justice and a common currency come into fruition?

1. Introduction Improvements in health and welfare have increased life expectancy in the world. Increasing life expectancy together with low fertility rates (in other words population ageing) is one of the greatest challenges that countries are facing now and in the future. Public pension spending increased 6.4% in the OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) between 1980-2007 in parallel with growing retired population (Adema, et al., 2011, p.3). Public spending on pensions and other retirement benefits in OECD countries grew on average 17.5% faster than national income between 1990 and 2005 (OECD, 2009, p.2). It will become harder for the governments to sustain fiscal sustainability of public pension systems in the long term. Life expectancy at birth for males is projected to increase by about 8 years over the projection period, from 76.7 in 2010 to 84.6 in 2060. Life expectancy at birth is projected to increase by 6.5 years for females, from 82.5 in 2010 to 89.1 in 2060 in the EU (European Union). On the other hand the total fertility rate is projected to rise from 1.59 in 2010 to 1.64 by 2030 and further to 1.71 by 2060. The EU population is projected to increase (from 502 million in 2010) up to 2040 by almost 5%, when it will peak (at 526 million). Thereafter, a steady decline occurs and the population shrinks by nearly 2% by 2060. Nonetheless, according to the projections, the population in 2060 will be slightly higher than in 2010, at 517 million. The age structure of the EU population is projected to change dramatically during projection period. It is projected that the population aged 15-64 will drop by 14%, and the population aged 65 and above will almost double, rising from 87.5 million in 2010 to 152.6 million in 2060 in the EU. Consequently the demographic old-age dependency ratio (people aged 65 or above relative to those aged 15-64) is projected to increase from 26% to 52.5% in the EU as a whole over the projection period (European Commission, 2012a, pp.24-27). The purpose of this study is firstly to present the public pension systems briefly and then evaluate the financial sustainability of public pension systems in consideration of pension expenditures, ageing and the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis. 2. Structures of Pension Systems in the EU Member Countries Pension systems in EU-27 differ from each other in a lot of ways such as general and financial structures, pension schemes, eligibility requirements, and conditions of normal and early retirements, historical past, income sources, economic development levels and demographic structures of member countries. However pension systems of many EU member countries rests on three pillars which are called as public pensions, funded occupational pensions and personal pension plans. The share of these pillars within the overall architecture varies from country to country. Classifications of mandatory parts of the pension systems of EU member countries in accordance with OECD are given in Table 1. EU countries generally use multiple programs which are designed to ensure pensioners achieve some absolute, minimum standard of living. Similarly the mandatory second-tier, savings components of pension systems are different across EU countries. Defined benefit (DB) plans are provided by the public sector in 12 EU countries and by the private sector in the Netherlands. Defined-contribution (DC) plans are compulsory in 6 EU countries. In Denmark and Sweden, there are quasi-mandatory, occupational DC schemes in addition to smaller compulsory plans. The notional-accounts schemes (sometimes call defined-contribution plans (NDC)) used by 3 countries (Italy, Poland and Sweden) and points schemes used by 4 countries (Estonia, France, Germany and Slovak Republic). When the pension schemes in EU member countries are analyzed, it is seen that public pensions dominate the pension system mostly, occupational pension schemes are mandatory only in Austria, Netherlands; mandatory for public sector employees in Ireland, Malta, Spain; mandatory for only for selected professions in Portugal, Slovenia and quasi mandatory in Denmark, Sweden and it does not exist in 8 countries. …

This chapter examines the European Union (EU) law concerning citizenship and the right of residence and free movement. It suggests that while citizenship provides a broad framework of rights, it is important to recognise the higher level of protection awarded to the economically active under Articles 45 (workers), 49 (establishment) and 56 (services) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). The chapter also considers the link between migration and the rights claimed, and the underlying concerns about the abuse of Union law rights. It also considers the position of third-country nationals (who are family members or dependents of an EU national) and students. This chapter also examines the social rights that arise as part of free-movement rights under Articles 21, 45, 49 and 59 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). As well as dealing with the provisions in the Citizens’ Rights Directive (CRD) (Directive 2004/38) and Regulation 492/2011, the chapter deals with social security and citizenship. This chapter also examines the European Union (EU) law concerning the free movement of persons and the limitations of this right on grounds of public health, public security, or public policy, including the ‘rule of reason’ and expulsion, refusal of entry or an entry ban due to criminal offences or other personal conduct. It considers the substantive scope of the derogation provisions and the procedural guarantees in the CRD applicable to EU citizens and their family members facing expulsion, refusal of entry or entry bans.

For several years, the European Union (EU) has faced two major crises at the same time – a global financial crisis that spilled over to the Eurozone countries and an immigration crisis. Those countries more negatively affected complain that the EU is ineffective in providing solutions, while better-off countries are reluctant to share the costs of the most exposed countries. In this critical context, radical populist parties have had specific incentives to offer extreme policy stances on the EU, signalling clear Eurosceptical positions as a means of breaking into the electoral market; their stance is now represented in the national parliament of many member states. The article examines the attitudes of national political elites towards the EU. It shows that the feelings towards the EU have largely survived acute changes (induced by the crises or changes to elite composition). Although Euroscepticism is a growing phenomenon within society and party systems, it is less on the rise among the elites holding public office. However, due to the unprecedented success of radical populist parties in some countries, Euroscepticism is now on the rise, also among this segment of elites, and some limited signs of contagion to the mainstream are already visible.