Referendums and political-institutional convergence in European democracies: A time-differencing configurational analysis

Abstract

AbstractThis study assesses democratic changes against the background of an increased use of referendums in European parliamentary systems. Existing studies on why referendums have become more frequent argue that it is due to the so-called ‘blurring’ of political alignments aiming to bypass institutional veto players. Which change of conditions is sufficient for a more frequent use of referendums? The proposed domestic conditions do not exclude external reasons, and related studies imply that various combinations of internal and external factors are worth exploring further. Accordingly, in our study we assess the configurations of political-institutional changes by using time-differencing Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA). First, we find that democratic convergence leads to multiple explanatory paths for referendum use. Second, the result suggests that explanations with simple majoritarian dynamics are robust compared to other explanations showing convergence. Third, the existence of many veto players combined with economic globalization is identified as an alternative explanation to the convergence toward more frequent referendum use. This study advances referendum and European integration research by highlighting the dynamics of simple majoritarian democratic systems, but also veto players and globalization over time. The results imply that more attention should be given to the configurational nature of an increased rise in referendums in European democracies.