Abstract

Merger review is one of the most prominent areas of competition policy. The international proliferation of national merger review policies during the last century reflects the emergence of free market economies throughout the world. The European Union’s (EU) own merger review and control regime reflects this proliferation and obliges two-level interaction with other jurisdictions because it makes clear that the activity of non-EU firms is subject to the Union’s competition policy if they are active in the Single European Market (SEM). This simple requirement of EU merger review surprises some observers because it gives the EU authority to review mergers among foreign firms and, therefore, places the Commission as chief of government (COG) in a two-level game in this policy area. When implementing merger review in individual cases, the win-set needs to be understood for Level II constituencies as the possible decisions the Commission could take when dealing with foreign firms. These decisions are typically taken in interaction with competition authorities in other jurisdictions. These other competition authorities then may act as COGs — which may pursue very different Level I strategies due to their different Level II preferences and institutions — in the two-level game of merger review implementation.

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