EU enlargement in the Western Balkans: strategies of borrowing and inventing

The rule of law is incorporated in the EU Founding Treaties and case-law of the Court of Justice of the EU and was included as a key requirement already in 1993 Copenhagen accession criteria. The EU enlargement is not only territorial increase, but also transposition of EU acquis to third countries. Since 1993, the monitoring mechanism of the rule of law reform in the EU accession countries was enhanced, including two specific negotiation chapters, Chapter 23 – judiciary and fundamental rights and Chapter 24 – justice, freedom and security. Over the last two decades, the EU was struggling to develop an adequate mechanism in this area, from mechanism for coordination and verification, to action plans for Chapter 23, to more specific tools like perception and experience surveys of the judiciary and functional reviews. Due to the challenges to measure progress and track record in the rule of law, in February 2020 the European Commission presented the new approach to EU Enlargement that aims to push reforms forward. The intention is to make the accession negotiations more credible, predictable and dynamic and criteria for assessing reforms in the accession countries will be based on the clearer criteria and more concise EU requirements. The article examines how EU enlargement policies influenced the rule of law reforms in Western Balkan countries over the years and what could be expected from the new approach. The research hypothesis is based on the correlation between Enlargement strategy towards the Western Balkans and its impact on rule of law in countries of the mentioned region. The methodological approach applied in the assessment is based on analysis of Enlargement strategy and other EU and national documents, as well as results of the work of judicial institutions in order to provide insight into the bottlenecks of the state rule of law in Western Balkan countries and enable identification of recommendations for improvement. The authors concluded that the new methodology would improve the measurability of the achieved results in the rule of law area, however, the approach might slow down the accession process of Serbia and Montenegro as a frontrunners in the process.

This chapter adopts both a historical and a comparative approach in studying EU enlargement. The aim here is to identify ‘whether' and ‘when' a country joins the Union, with an emphasis on the currently ongoing enlargement process in the Western Balkans. It starts with an overview of the conceptual and theoretical framework for studying and explaining EU enlargement. It then reviews how EU enlargement has proceeded over time by looking at its successful and unsuccessful cases, with a particular focus on the motivations and explanations associated with each of them. The chapter considers the successful rounds of enlargement, the reluctant and the awkward cases, and the ongoing (laggard) Southeastern Enlargement round. It discusses the main EU enlargement dilemmas and their implications for the current (unfinished) enlargement round in the Western Balkans in detail.

The EU assumed that conditionality would help the countries in the Western Balkans to establish liberal democracies and functional states that are able to deal with the past. It prescribed a strategy while largely neglecting the local traditions, practices and existing civil society organizations that operate on the ground. The European solutions and strategies in the field of transitional justice are not part of the general EU practices, and consequently lack specific policies and operational guidelines for their implementation. While cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) became a key condition for all Western Balkan states as part of their EU accession, other forms of transitional justice and reconciliation have found little support in the EU. However, while the ICTY has been able to prosecute some of the people responsible for the war crimes in the former Yugoslavia, it has been unable to foster a deeper process of reconciliation and regional cooperation. Hence, the EU should focus on local initiatives which support these processes and enable a more ‘grass-roots’ approach to dealing with the past. The European Union (EU) assumes that conditionality would help the countries in the Western Balkans to establish liberal democracies and functional states that are able to deal with the past. This chapter analyses the EU's conditionality and its sole focus on international criminal justice. It examines some of the theoretical arguments in favour of the establishment of domestic judicial and non-judicial mechanisms of justice. It also explores the origins, actors and motivations of regional efforts for the formation of RECOM, which seeks support from the citizens and governments in all successor states of the former Yugoslavia. RECOM strengthens the rule of law in the region by fulfilling the rights of victims to know what happened to them, their loved ones and the region they live. It embodies regional cooperation, exchange of information and aims that are compatible with the normative state building goals of the EU in the Western Balkans, such as reconciliation, good neighbourly relations and democratization.

The enlargement of the European Union towards the Western Balkans has faced significant slowdown in recent times, despite nominal support for enlargement from both the EU and the candidate countries of the region. This paper examines the factors contributing to the stagnation of the enlargement process, categorizing them into internal and external factors. Internally, the EU is facing what is dubbed “the enlargement fatigue” phenomenon, where the EU and its Member States are not fully committed and are less enthusiastic towards further EU enlargement. What further exacerbates the problem are the various internal crises the EU has faced in recent times: the 2008 financial and eurozone crisis, the migrant crisis, Brexit, and the recent COVID-19 crisis. Furthermore, the process of enlargement has become politicized in the sense that Member States use their status in the negotiation process for political leverage and gain. On the other side, externally, the region of the Western Balkans is home to foreign non-EU geopolitical influences of Russia, China, Turkey, and the Gulf states. However, more importantly, Western Balkan countries still have major problems with state capture, corruption, and the weak rule of law, which severely hamper their ascension processes. This study employs a comparative and descriptive approach, synthesizing primary EU documents and secondary academic sources to provide a comprehensive analysis of the evolving enlargement framework. The findings suggest that while EU engagement remains crucial, both the EU and Western Balkan states must undertake substantive reforms and commitments to break the current impasse and revitalize the accession process.

Montenegro and Serbia are stuck in the EU accession negotiations, while, with Albania and North Macedonia, the perspective of their future course is very unclear. Between still relatively fluid elements of the new enlargement methodology presented in February 2020 and quite a weak political impulse given by the Zagreb Declaration adopted in May 2020, the potential accession to the EU of the four Western Balkans candidate countries remains not only uncertain, but seems even less realistic than it was after the Thessaloniki Summit in 2003. The paper shows how, just in the first five months of 2020, the path of the Western Balkans towards EU accession has managed to go one timid step forward and two solid steps back. First, some elements of a novel approach to accession are encouraging, but remain imprecise, often inapplicable and subject to potential divergent interpretation. Second, maintained top-down conditionality, combined with internal difficulties of all Western Balkans countries and their high adjustment costs to meet membership criteria could lead to the crumbling of pro-European consensus and a decline of democracy. Finally, the Conclusions of the Zagreb Summit mentioned neither accession nor membership in the EU, confirming the wavering political support for enlargement among Member States. The main methods used in the paper are content analysis and the comparative legal method, while the analysis of the Montenegrin and Serbian case provides evidence for the correlation between the weaknesses of the Zagreb Declaration and the hypothesised second step back in the accession process. Keywords: EU enlargement, Western Balkans, conditionality, accession criteria, law approximation. This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution − Non-Commercial − No Derivatives 4.0 International License. Suggested citation: U Cemalovic, ‘One Step Forward, Two Steps Back: The EU and the Western Balkans After the Adoption of the New Enlargement Methodology and the Conclusions of the Zagreb Summit’ (2020) 16 CYELP 179.

Alexandre Kostov, ed. <i>Contemporary Balkans. The Challenges of the 21st Century</i>

Chapter 1 Introduction 1.1 Census-taking and EU enlargement in the Western Balkans 1.2 Research question(s) 1.3 Europeanisation 1.4 Methodology 1.5 The paradox of collecting ethno-cultural data in censuses 1.6 Europeanisation of census-taking in the Western Balkans 1.7 State capacity, domestic and external actors 1.8 Contributions & relevance 1.9 Outline of the thesis Chapter 2 Counting for enlargement? The theory behind the Europeanisation of census-taking Abstract 2.1 Introduction 2.2 Europeanisation 2.3 Europeanisation in enlargement countries 2.4 Compliance with the EU census regulations 2.4.1 The census requirements 2.4.2 Measuring compliance with the EU census regulations 2.5 Embedding Europeanisation in the chapters 2.5.1 Europeanisation of census-taking and the paradox of collecting ethno-cultural data 2.5.2 Conditionality and legitimacy of the Europeanisation of censustaking 2.5.3 State capacity, domestic and external actors 2.6 Conclusion Chapter 3 Using a mixed methods research design while studying census-taking in the Western Balkans Abstract 3.1 Introduction 3.2 Mixed methods: potential designs and selected model 3.3 Illustrative study 3.4 Research design 3.5 Qualitative data collection: In-depth interviews 6 3.6 Quantitative data collection: Expert survey 3.7 Discussion and conclusion Chapter 4 Counting for what purpose? The paradox of including ethnic and cultural questions in the censuses of Croatia, Bosnia and Macedonia Abstract 4.1 Introduction 4.2 The sensitivities of census-taking 4.3 Europeanisation and census-taking 4.4 Expert perspectives on counting ethnic and cultural characteristics 4.5 Ethnic and cultural categories in Croatia, Bosnia and Macedonia 4.5.1 Croatia 4.5.2 Bosnia and Herzegovina 4.5.3 Macedonia 4.6 Comparison 4.7 Conclusion Chapter 5 'When counting counts': Europeanisation of census-taking in Croatia, Bosnia and Macedonia Abstract 5.1 Introduction 5.2 Census-taking within Europeanisation 5.3 Europeanisation of census-taking: Conceptual framework 5.3.1 Conditionality 5.3.2 Legitimacy 5.4 Method, case selection and data 5.5 When counting counts: Case analysis 5.5.1 Bosnia and Herzegovina 5.5.2 The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 5.5.3 Croatia 5.6 Conclusion Chapter 6 Census-taking in the Western Balkans: A matter of state capacity or the influence of domestic and external actors? Abstract 11 voice in my head provided me with the much needed strength to complete this project.

This study explores the dynamics of the European Union's overarching diplomacy of its accession partnership diplomacy within the context of the Western Balkans and the Eastern Partnership. It examines the evolving boundaries and issues spanning inseparable from new exclusions and limits-making by the Union's geodiplomacy. The focus is on its saddened shift from conducting neighbourhood partnership diplomacy to accession partnership diplomacy with Ukraine, Moldova, and potentially Georgia, and the conduct of accession partnership diplomacy with the Western Balkans over the past two and a half decades This transition has been influenced by the formation of semisovereign small states in the Balkans and the strategic encirclement of the region by the EU since 1997. The study also highlights recent developments since mid-2022, particularly the change in the EU's approach towards Ukraine, Moldova, and potentially Georgia, marking a significant shift from previously denying these states the possibility of accession. This shift reflects Europe's strategic redirection in response to evolving geopolitical rivalries, particularly with China's "Global Modernization Order". The research reveals an increasing complexity in EU accession partnership diplomacy, impacted by regional and global power dynamics. The focus is on contrasts between the EU's strategies in the Eastern Partnership and the Western Balkans, emphasizing the evolving geodiplomatic context since Russia's aggression against Ukraine on February 24, 2024. This aggression has dismantled the post-Cold War European order, necessitating a re-evaluation of the EU's approach to its neighbouring countries. The study addresses the surprising disparities in the Union's diplomatic engagements between the Eastern European Partnership and the Western Balkans. Despite seeming continuity, recent events challenge existing theoretical frameworks and empirical findings, requiring more profound analysis. The unexpected evolution from neighbourhood partnership diplomacy to accession partnership diplomacy with Ukraine, Moldova, and potentially Georgia calls for rethinking Europe's geostrategic stance and implications for the EU's enlargement policy. Findings indicate that the EU's accession partnership diplomacy has shifted significantly due to evolving geodiplomatic realities of rivalry. The aggression of Russia against Ukraine has disrupted the previous order, leading the Union to reconsider its approach towards Eastern European neighbours. This research underscores the influence of global rivalries, particularly with China, on the EU's diplomatic strategies. The evolving geopolitical tensions have necessitated a more nuanced approach to accession partnership diplomacy, incorporating broader global strategic considerations. Challenges related to the EU's approach to semi-sovereign states and the balancing act required to manage internal and external relations are identified. The study suggests that the EU's geodiplomatic strategies need to adapt to the changing global order, addressing pressures from both Western and non-Western powers. It advocates for a more flexible and adaptive approach in EU accession partnership diplomacy, highlighting the need for continued engagement with Eastern European countries and the Western Balkans while navigating the broader geopolitical landscape. In conclusion, the study argues that the EU's accession partnership diplomacy must evolve in response to a dramatic disruption of human entanglements with nature demanding mutuality as the only relation securing the continuation of human existence on this planet. A geodiplomatic realignment is necessary to address these new realities, ensuring that the EU remains a pivotal player by reinvigorating the European integration process and shaping the future of global diplomacy.

This article examines the United Kingdom’s approach to the question of European Union enlargement in the Western Balkans. It shows that while Britain had no traditional attachment to the region, it championed expansion as part of its long-standing aim to widen EU membership to prevent deeper political union. However, as immigration from the EU increased after the 2004 enlargement and a Eurosceptic Conservative-led government took charge in 2010, official support for enlargement began to decline. Britain ceded its place to Germany as the strongest supporter of EU expansion. Meanwhile, during the referendum campaign on EU membership, the prospect that future enlargement could further increase the number of migrants emerged as a central point of debate. Although this discussion was primarily focused on Turkey, the Western Balkans also played a part. Therefore, even had the United Kingdom decided to remain in the EU, there is an argument to be made that Britain could well have become more opposed towards future expansion. As it is, the decision to leave the EU (Brexit), has ensured that Britain has now all but lost its say over enlargement.

This article aims to explain the nature of Russian foreign policy towards the Western Balkan states, taking into account the role of other actors such as the European Union, an increasingly important player in this radically changed geopolitical context. Since the fall of the communist regime, the Western Balkans have faced major challenges and have been at the forefront of debates on critical issues such as transatlantic relations (with regard to NATO and EU enlargement, as well as EU defence policy and security). In recent times, the Balkan region has come under the influence of the Great Powers. Therefore, as a Great Power, Russia is building a foothold in the Balkans, a move criticized and not welcomed by other countries or actors. Furthermore, Moscow is unique in terms of its range of capabilities, including its “hard” and “soft power.” This article aims to understand and analyse Russia’s policy and strategy in the Western Balkans.

This article analyses effects of Brexit on relations between the United Kingdom and the Western Balkan countries (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Serbia). First, the symbolism of the UK departure from the EU for the Western Balkans is explained. In the following step, multiple types of relations (in trade, security, culture) between the post-Brexit UK and this region are analysed using the theoretical concepts of linkage, leverage and soft power. Finally, the consequences of Brexit on further EU enlargement are presented. The research has confirmed the initial hypotheses. First, as expected, the volume and density of UK-Western Balkan relations will be reduced after Brexit. Second, Western Balkans is of a very limited interest for the UK, primarily in security. Third, Brexit has not in a serious way changed the already existing low chances of EU accession for the Western Balkan countries. The reason for this has little to do with the UK’s presence in or absence from the EU and is rather a consequence of the majority view within the Union (that Britain had already shared before Brexit) concerning further enlargement and low level of preparation of Western Balkan countries for EU membership.

This article constitutes a response to David Chandler and his conception of the European Union's role in the western Balkans as a contemporary form of empire-building which he argues has deeply compromised the process of democratic institution-building in a still fragile region. It analyses his view that the EU enlargement process is entirely asymmetric in design and process and contends that there is ample room for candidate states both to contest EU demands and shape their own paths toward membership. This is entirely consistent with the evidence from the EU's previous enlargement, its most ambitious to date, which saw ten states from Central and Eastern Europe become members in 2004 and 2007. The EU enlargement regime is thus a tried and tested one and constitutes the most successful instrument in the EU's external relations toolkit. But it is now facing a challenge in the western Balkans that is manifestly more difficult than anything encountered in previous accession contexts. In particular, the problem of first order democratisation, extending to the practice of state-building, remains cogent and, in the fallout from the Kosovan declaration of independence all the more important in regional terms.

The aspirations of the Western Balkan countries towards Europe have become central to the political and social life of the region. This paper examines the linguistic representation of the Western Balkans and the discourse surrounding their European integration in online pan-European media articles written in English. The discourse of European integration for the Western Balkans often includes analogical references to past conflicts, whose remnants continue to the present time and pose significant challenges to the region’s progress. By analysing the temporal domain of this discourse through the lens of Discourse Space Theory and Proximization Theory, analogical temporal proximization more specifically, and its projection of values onto the axiological domain, this paper looks at the ideological function of language and explores the extent to which the Western Balkans is perceived as a region where past conflicts threaten future stability and how EU accession is viewed as a path to long-awaited liberation and prosperity.

Fake, Partial and Imposed Compliance: The Limits of the EU's Normative Power in the Western Balkans

This article is dedicated to the German policy towards the EU enlargement. Its history as well as the current German policy towards prospective enlargements are analyzed in this paper. The article offers party-political and sociological analysis of Germany`s attitude towards the EU enlargement, also the reasons for it are determined. FRG supported all of the European Community and European Union enlargements. This line is being continued, but nowadays only step to step approach is being supported. Germany‘s motives to the EU enlargement are based on the liberal concept of the common security. The main goals of this policy are the including of European countries into the Western community of developed countries (the EU), the extension of the stability and security area. The economic integration is also very important for Germany. The key priority of the EU enlargement is the Western Balkan region (the so called “Europeanisation” of Western Balkans). This process is being supported by political elites of the region and by the European Union itself. It is recognized, that the Europeanisation of Western Balkans was used as a sample for the Eastern Partnership Program. Without consideration of the Russian factor, though, this strategy towards the post-Soviet countries has many weaknesses. But the EU-membership for the Eastern Partnership members is not excluded.