Ethiopia: A Democratic Developmental State?

Is it possible to reconcile one of the institutional strategies to promote development, known in the literature as “the developmental state”, with contemporary democratic systems of government? If so, what are the challenges, trade-offs and potential gains that such an effort may entail? The vast literature on “the developmental state” claims that it is more likely to succeed under autocratic regimes. While a “democratic developmental state” seems possible in theory, there is very little empirical evidence to show how it would work in practice. This article tries to contribute to this debate by analyzing the case of Brazil, a country that transitioned from a military dictatorship to a democratic regime in the late 1980s, and has been moving towards increasing state interventionism since 2002. While the policies implemented by the “New Developmental State” in Brazil have been explored in the academic literature, their democratic dimensions remain unchartered. There has not been a detailed analysis about how the autocratic features that characterized the developmental states in Latin America from the 1950s to the end of the 1980s (i. e. political exclusion of the majority of groups, and control of economic policies by an elite) have played out in its renewed version. Understanding the interactions between the New Developmental State and the democratic system not only allows for a better understanding of the Brazilian case, but it also sheds light on one of the most important theoretical questions raised by the development literature: is a democratic developmental state possible? Based on the Brazilian case study, we argue that it is not hard to reconcile “the developmental state” with a thin conception of democracy, i. e. with free and fair elections. In contrast, the picture is more complex if the question is whether it is possible to reconcile developmental policies with a thicker conception of democracy that includes demands for transparency, protection of minority groups, a system of checks and balances, and due process. To develop this argument, this article is divided in three parts. In the first part, we provide an overview of the literature, outlining the concept of developmental state, and the tensions that the developmental state policies may create in a democratic setting. In the second part, we focus on the Brazilian case (the “new developmental state”), exploring how these tensions played out in three concrete settings: industrial policy, infrastructure sectors, and social policies. In the third part, we identify some of the research implications of the challenges identified in the Brazilian case, especially for future law and development scholarship.

This article analyses key policies and documents, which form the basis of democratic South Africa’s desire to becoming a developmental state. In order to understand the notion of a developmental state, I provide a discussion on the theoretical foundations of the concept by drawing on examples from other countries (such as the Asian Tigers) that have embarked on a journey to become developmental states. Through a comparative analysis, and by probing the National Development Plan (NDP), as well as the work of the National Planning Commission (NPC) broadly, I examine South Africa’s prospects of becoming a developmental state. To this effect, I argue that although the foundation that was laid for South Africa to become a democratic developmental state (DDS) was relatively solid, South Africa has veered far away from becoming a developmental state any time soon. But, given the existing institutional architecture, as well as an assessment of developmental outcomes, it would seem that South Africa can still become a viable developmental state—although South Africa has lost many of the salient attributes of developmental states. It is also worth highlighting that it was always going to be difficult for South Africa to become a developmental state because of the political and economic history of the country. The article makes suggestions with regard to what could be done to ensure that South Africa becomes a viable, fully-fledged, democratic developmental state.

This chapter discusses challenges facing emerging states that promote development under democratization and globalization It compares two types of developmental state that is, ‘authoritarian developmental state’ and ‘democratic developmental state’. Indonesia experienced both types of developmental states during the last five decades. The chapter looks at similarities and differences between the two types from the viewpoint of institutions, policies, and policymakers under the respective given external conditions. By doing so, it explores the key characteristics inherent in ‘democratic developmental state’ in the context of the twenty-first century.

The positive development outcomes of the Post 1945 external assistance for war-torn Europe through Marshal Plan caught the attentions of third world countries and academics to repeat the lesson in Africa and elsewhere. However, except Asian Tiger countries(South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore) and Japan, whose state intervention is critical, no African state has achieved sustainable economic growth and industrialization. However, some researchers argue that despite such poor economic performances of African states, South Africa and Botswana were successful in bringing sustainable economic growth and development. Consequently, they claimed that only these states that fulfill most of the requirements of democratic developmental state characteristics in Africa. However, the writer argues that Ethiopia is the only democratic developmental state in Africa that by and large satisfy the prerequisites for democratic developmental state; i.e.; land ownership system, corruption incidence, income equality, extreme poverty reduction and most importantly the presence of development-oriented leadership and the adoption of long term development plan. To prove my assumptions, a document analysis is used as the main tool of investigation of the problem and analysis.

Achieving economic growth and sustainable development remain the prior policy all nation states across the world. To achieve their sustainable development and economic growth goals, international communities has been fermenting and diagnosing various development models and paradigms. However, there is no one size and fit all development paradigms which obliged to be followed by nation states around the globe. This paper examines developmental state growth model and its nexus with democratization with reference to Ethiopian democratic developmental state growth model. The paper employed qualitative research approach as a research methodology. This paper is based on desk review. This paper argued that, even though EPRDF government claim the country as democratic developmental state which is unique to Asian authoritarian developmental state, the country portrayed as one of poor human right records and leading journalist jailer in the Africa despite the country has been witnessing the fastest economic growth for the last ten consecutive years. This paper also argued that Ethiopian developmental state and democratization process is contradictory since Ethiopian governments have been garnering the political legitimacy through development achievement not directly from public elections and the government has been using the economic achievement as an excuse for its democratic back sliding and democratic deconsolidation in Ethiopia.

The South African National Development Plan envisions a capable democratic developmental state as the only response to the country’s deteriorating triple challenges of unemployment, poverty and inequality. A developmental state denotes a development theory that advocates for a state-led development model to accelerate economic growth and rapid industrialisation. However, most successful developmental states were led by authoritarian regimes. The rise of democracy within emerging and developing economies invokes a different kind of developmental state model, based on democratic development and the active role of subnational governments. Despite subnational governments playing a key role in democratic development, there is limited literature on the role of subnational institutions in building and consolidating democratic developmental states. This article analyses the role and contribution of subnational institutions in strengthening South Africa’s emerging democratic developmental state through developmental local government. It argues that developmental local government is underpinned by the structural and developmental ideology of a (democratic) developmental state. The article further illustrates how critical features such as maximising social and economic development; promoting democratic development; integrating and coordinating development; and building social capital are used to consolidate South Africa’s emerging democratic developmental states from below.

This chapter evaluates the current debate within South African academic and policy communities about whether or not South Africa is capable of becoming a ‘developmental state’. It does so by addressing two prior questions: To what extent is developmental state theory and practice consonant or in conflict with neoliberal reforms and policy norms? And: Are theories developed from other regions and systems of accumulation relevant to states for whom mineral extraction presently constitutes a major sector (or the predominant mode) of economic activity? In so doing, it is necessary to distinguish the question of whether developmental states are even possible from that of the nature of state autonomy or state capacity. Particularly in ‘development studies’ literature, these latter issues are often conflated with developmental states, with ‘capacity’ in particular often invoked in apolitical, technocratic terms. But if developmental projects are of any consequence or show any ambition — and the idea of a ‘democratic developmental state’ (DDS) is nothing if not ambitious — then it is well to acknowledge at the outset that these terms and goals are thoroughly political.

As an emerging donor of Official Development Assistance (ODA), the South Korean government has announced that it will provide a ‘South Korean Model of Development Cooperation’. This paper explores how the South Korean development experience from the twentieth century can be transformed into an alternative for development cooperation in the twenty-first century. The early aid management system in South Korea contributed to the bureaucratic capacity-building that was necessary for the installation of the developmental state. In its quest for industrialization, the authoritarian developmental state in South Korea maintained autonomy vis-à-vis foreign donors, foretelling the ‘country ownership’ principle in today's global norms of ODA. However instructive the South Korean experience may be, it will not work as a ‘one size fits all’ model for the twenty-first century development due to such fundamental changes in the global political economy as the WTO regime and democracy promotion. In this regard, South Korea's own double transition of economic liberalization and democratization offers another important lesson. Therefore, we suggest a South Korean ‘alternative’ that respects both the global norms for development cooperation and the national democratic aspirations. It would be a democratic developmental state whose autonomy is more deeply embedded in civil society and whose capacity further expands human capabilities.

This article focuses on the contribution, actual or potential, of political parties to the project of a ‘democratic developmental state’. In the classic developmental state, individual hegemonic parties often, though by no means always, played a key role. However, on the available evidence, parties make a very limited contribution to the emergence of new democratic developmental states, in terms of either democracy‐building or policy‐making, recruitment, ensuring accountability or policy implementation. Reasons include weak institutionalisation and the prevalence of clientelism. External assistance, nevertheless, is likely to be limited in impact and, given the importance of autonomous party development, should ideally be indirect.

Developmental States in Africa pioneered by Nkrumah’s Pan-Africanism, Nyerere’s Ujamaa, and Kaunda’s Humanism were the first attempts to involve the local African citizenry in the ownership of the means of production to improve their livelihoods during the post-independence era. However due to a myriad of problems these efforts failed leading to underdevelopment. Democratic developmental states mark a paradigm shift that attempts to ‘brings back politics’ to the majority poor to improve their livelihoods as it believed that democracy and development are self-reinforcing. Technology is fundamental in operationalizing democratic developmental states objectives in Africa if this ideology is to become a reality. Space research and deployment of supporting technologies including remote sensing and Geospatial Information Systems (GIS) remain fundamental to bridge the technological gap between Africa and the rest of the world hence tackling Africa’s biggest challenges. This paper will have a dual structure firstly, analyzing a (SWOT) analysis, the Strength, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats that Africa is facing if it embarks on Geospatial Technology to solve critical challenges. Secondly, the paper will look in detail using Threats, Opportunities, Weaknesses and Strengths (TOWS) analysis that will present action plans using the Strengths/Opportunities, Strengths/Threats, Weaknesses/Opportunities and finally Weaknesses/Threats framework. These linkages will assist in the strategic planning of how GIS can be applied innovatively and thus bridging the technology gap between the African continent and the rest of the world to foster economic development.

The prevalence of xenophobic violence toward foreigners has hindered South Africa’s ambition to become a developmental state since 2007, when the concept of a “democratic developmental state” was first endorsed during the African National Congress (ANC) conference in Polokwane. This ambition has also been thwarted by the inability of the post-apartheid regime to provide adequate and sustainable services to the citizens. Xenophobia has disrupted economic growth and has contributed to poor service delivery in local municipalities, thus leading to social protests. The developmental state depends mainly on a solid balance of economic growth and human development. It also leans on the capacity of the state to establish policies that address poverty and promote the expansion of solid economic opportunities. In this endeavor, migrants increase economic growth and make it sustainable, increase productivity, and promote the labor market. They also promote the labor force and human capital, economic growth, and public finance, thus enabling the realization of a developmental state. However, xenophobia has limited migrants’ contributions to economic growth and social well-being in South Africa. It has destructive effects on South Africa’s economic structure and growth, thus affecting the delivery of adequate services that would enhance its ability to achieve a developmental state. The paper recommends that there is a need for South Africa to understand that xenophobia affects economic growth and the service delivery framework. To address the prevalence of xenophobia and achieve its ambition of a developmental state, South Africa needs to hasten its responses to curb xenophobia and integrate migrants into economic opportunities. The paper adopted a qualitative research methodology and conceptual and document analysis techniques to collect data that enabled the achievement of the above assertions.

DOI : 10.7176/IAGS/72-01 Publication date :May 31 st 2019 Introduction The past three years, anti-government protests in Ethiopia revealed that the country is moving from rising narratives to civil unrest. The civil unrest mainly emanates from the official state discourse of ‘democratic developmental state’, revolutionary democracy and other competing narratives (Branch and Mampilly, 2015). To facilitate a systematic paradigm moves from the democratic transition to economic development, the developmental state narratives become the official ideology of the state (Abbink, 2017; Allo, 2017). Following the disgraceful 2005 election where opposition political parties won major urban areas in including the capital city of Addis Ababa (Lefort, 2007), the Ethiopia People Revolution Democratic Front (hereafter EPRDF) introduces many political and economic reforms to restore its legitimacy. For many observers, the EPRDF’s thriving development narratives, however, depoliticize society, widen social gaps, justify violent repression, and entrench ‘ritual’ power. Besides, Elites governing narratives extend, legitimize, and sustain a defacto power of the government. (Allo, 2017; Di Nunzio, 2015). Failure to comply rules creates we-they nature of relationship and above all the state politicisation of megaprojects results create an "otherness" of those who do not support such mega projects (Allo, 2017; Lefort, 2007). Finally, the open anti-government protest began in 2015 and continued until 24 March 2018. This paper, therefore, discusses the dynamics of power relation between the government and protesters based on Scott conceptual analysis of ‘domination and art of resistance’ which reveals how elite complex domination strategies pushed subordinate groups to develop resistance strategies. Scott has also reformulated the sources of resentment, driving us to look beyond points of open conflict to social spaces where different ideas and thoughts are created. For Scott (1990, P. 70) ‘‘[the powerful] … have a vital interest in keeping up the appearances appropriate to their form of domination. Subordinates, for their part, ordinarily have good reasons to help sustain those appearances or, at least, not openly to contradict them’’. These two social realities have implication for the study of power relations. Study protest from this perspective also helps to understand the underlying problems of power relation before the eruption of open protest. The 2015 anti-government protest perhaps discloses the rationality of conformity and elite’s strategies of domination. Therefore, analysing this social space and underlying power relation offers different perspectives of resistance to imposed domination which is the desired objective of this study.

In the months following his death on 20 August, Ethiopia's Prime Minister Meles Zenawi has been eulogized and demonized in equal measure. But his policies, and the transformational paradigm on which they were based, have rarely been elucidated. While alive, Meles was equally indifferent to praise and blame. To those who acclaimed Ethiopia's remarkable economic growth, he would ask, do they understand that his policies completely contradicted the neo-liberal Washington Consensus? To those who condemned his measures against the political opposition and civil society organizations, he demanded to know how they would define democracy and seek a feasible path to it, in a political economy dominated by patronage and rent seeking? Meles did not hide his views, but neither did he ever fully present his theory of the ‘democratic developmental state’ to an international audience. Over nearly 25 years, I was fortunate to be able to discuss political economy with him regularly, including critiquing his incomplete and unpublished master's dissertation. During this time, his thinking evolved, but his basic principles and sensibilities remained constant. World leaders have lauded Meles' economic achievements without acknowledging their theoretical basis. Human rights organizations have decried his political record as though he were a routine despot with no agenda other than hanging on to power. Reviewing his writings on the developmental state, this essay shows the unity of his theory and practice. Meles had the quiet certitude of someone who had been tested – and seen his people tested – to the limit. Along with his comrades in arms in the leadership of the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF), he had looked into the abyss of collective destruction, and his career was coloured by the knowledge that Ethiopia could still go over that precipice. Many times during sixteen years of armed struggle in the mountains …

The Democratic Developmental State (DDS) model was attempted during the tenure of the Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic Front’s (EPRDF) in Ethiopia. In this paper, an effort has been made hence to explore some economic blessings and political curses incurred, cases for launching and now terminating DDS, and the reform-led changes and continuities in the political economy of Ethiopia. In doing so, the researcher has depended on a qualitative approach and in-depth content analysis of secondary data sources. The finding revealed that the ideological confrontations and lusts for power coupled with the fragile institutional and structural profiles of the EPRDF-led government have precipitated the abortion of the embryonic DDS. Indeed, in the pursuit of DDS, a trade-off between promoting democracy and achieving economic development has remained at a tolerable cost. In consequence, protracted popular grievances against the unequal distribution of benefits have been accompanied by paving the birth of a new leadership submissive to the Neo-Liberal recipes. Now, the state seems as it goes to start from scratch despite some belief that the new leadership appears to regurgitate the footsteps of its predecessor EPRDF rebranding the infamous legacy. It has been found that the reformist part of the government has been facing coordination problems to materialize the political and economic reforms. To this effect, early costs of the beginnings of the reform have been encountered. For that reason, the researcher suggests that the incumbent government should constitutionally and inclusively overcome the state-wide leadership crisis to ensure positive synergy.

Do political democratization and the worsening income inequality result in the increase in public support for redistribution in East Asian democratic developmental welfare states? This study aims to examine atypical case of new democratic developmental welfare state, Taiwan, through quantitative analysis. Our empirical findings demonstrated that the perception of income inequality will cause dissatisfaction with the performance of the democratic regime, and then, erode public support for redistribution. This study argues that the mitigation of income inequality would be helpful to increase political satisfaction and for welfare state building for new democracies.