Establishing a Hierarchy of Human Rights: Ideal Solution or Fallacy?

Abstract

The Article discusses the difficulties of establishing a hierarchy of norms in international law, particularly with regard to human rights norms. A number of arguments have been put forward but none of them has proven to be conclusive: be it the distinction between treaty-based norms and norms of customary law, be it the non-restrictability or non-derogability of some treaty rights, be it their erga omnes character or the inadmissibility to make reservations. The best way to address the issue of hierarchy seems to be the concept of jus cogens. However, the consequences of some rights being “superior” to others are by no means clear. The fact that certain rights are addressed in court decisions as being “most fundamental” or representing a “supreme value” does not necessarily mean that these rights prevail over other, seemingly “inferior” rights in a given case. This is so because it is difficult to decide in abstracto and in advance possible conflicts of human rights positions of different human beings. The Article therefore recommends a very reluctant use of a terminology pointing at a hierarchy between human rights.