Abstract
The aim of this study is to offer a reflection on the theory of knowledge of Francisco Suarez and his nominalism in the light of Sextus Empiricus’ sceptical thought in his Outlines of Pyrrhonism. It is Sextus who allows us to compare the epistemology of Suarez with a dynamic system of knowledge. With this in view, in the first place, I examine Sextus’s scepticism and Suarez’s nominalist ontology. In the second place, I analyse the mental representation as conceived by Sextus in analogy with the formal and objective concepts of Suarez, and I also discuss the concept of relation in both authors. Finally, I proceed to examine the concept of belief inasmuch as certain restrictions in the configuration of our judgements are manifest and recognized.
Highlights
The aim of this study is to offer a reflection on the theory of knowledge of Francisco Suárez and his nominalism in the light of Sextus Empiricus’ sceptical thought in his Outlines of Pyrrhonism
It is Sextus who allows us to compare the epistemology of Suárez with a dynamic system of knowledge
I analyse the mental representation as conceived by Sextus in analogy with the formal and objective concepts of Suárez, and I discuss the concept of relation in both authors
Summary
Sexto, Esbozos Pirrónicos, introducción, traducción y notas de Antonio Gallego Cao y Teresa Muñoz Diego, Madrid: Gredos, 1993. Es por esta capacidad que nosotros podemos realizar la suspensión del juicio en cuanto respondemos con una antítesis o proposición contrapuesta equivalente a la enunciada en primera instancia. Aunque cabe decir que el escepticismo de Sexto asiente a las sensaciones que se nos imponen, lo que le interesa sobre todo a Sexto es evitar el dogmatismo en cuanto a creencias fijas sobre la realidad precisamente por no ser las creencias cosas manifiestas como lo son las sensaciones. Esta es la tesis de Sexto, aunque es importante no olvidar que el escepticismo pirrónico de Sexto no consiste en una desconfianza absoluta por la posibilidad de conocer sino, como ya se señaló, en la capacidad de establecer proposiciones contrapuestas o de establecer antítesis a las mencionadas en una primera instancia con la finalidad de suspender el juicio. Y es que la razón universal de las cosas solo se dice por una razón de comunicación hacia los inferiores, como el hombre en cuanto tal que puede dividirse en los hombres concretos
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