Abstract

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was born in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, and represents one of the largest ever reorganizations of the U.S. government. Although the department's creation precipitated a complex conglomeration of 22 diverse agencies and offices, the institutional response in the U.S. Congress has been similarly complex. Ambiguities in the jurisdictions of congressional committees, exacerbated by the emergence of new homeland security issues, have led to a highly fragmented oversight of the six-year-old department. In the 110th Congress, for example, 86 committees and subcommittees asserted some form of jurisdiction over the DHS. After considering the effects of fragmentation on the DHS, this paper considers the experience of three other, relatively young departments. In doing so, it becomes evident that the DHS' experience is anomalous among executive departments. Analysis of hearing data from 2007-2008 reveals a number of key faultlines in committee jurisdictions over the DHS. After probing those areas of contention between committees, this paper makes recommendations as to what jurisdictional changes can be made to reverse the fragmentation trend in Congress. Lastly, success in consolidating congressional jurisdiction over the DHS must be politically realistic, acknowledging likely institutional resistance. While the ideal strategy would be immediate statutory reforms to committee jurisdictions in the 111th Congress, a more incremental campaign to streamline oversight of the DHS may be necessary in the long run. Through the implementation of these proposals, the debilitating effects of fragmentation on senior department leadership and mission execution can be minimized.

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