Erratum: Chinese College Admissions and School Choice Reforms: A Theoretical Analysis

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Previous articleNext article FreeErratumErratum: Chinese College Admissions and School Choice Reforms: A Theoretical AnalysisYan Chen and Onur KestenYan ChenUniversity of Michigan and Tsinghua University Search for more articles by this author and Onur KestenUniversity of Sydney Search for more articles by this author Original articleChinese College Admissions and School Choice Reforms: A Theoretical AnalysisPDFPDF PLUSFull Text Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinked InRedditEmailQR Code SectionsMoreBy definition, if mechanism φe is more manipulable than mechanism φe′, then any truth-telling Nash equilibrium (where all students report their true preferences) of φe is also a Nash equilibrium of φe′. Therefore, corollary 2 (which is implied by theorem 1) in the paper “Chinese College Admissions and School Choice Reforms: A Theoretical Analysis,” published in the February 2017 issue of the Journal of Political Economy (vol. 125 (1)), is incorrect. Equilibrium comparisons in corollary 2 hold under truth telling. The corrected statement of corollary 2 is as follows.Corollary 2. Any truth-telling Nash equilibrium of the preference revelation game associated with φe is also a Nash equilibrium of that of φe′ where e′>e.Similarly, equilibrium comparisons in theorem 2 and its extension theorem 5, which invoke corollary 2, hold under truth telling. The corrected statement of theorem 2 is as follows.Theorem 2. Let e′=ke for some k∈ℕ∪{∞}. Any truth-telling equilibrium of φe that leads to a stable matching is also an equilibrium of φe′ and leads to the same stable matching. However, the converse is not true; that is, there are stable truth-telling equilibria of φe′ that neither may be equilibria nor may be stable under φe.With this modification, the converse statement in theorem 2 (and in its extension theorem 5) still holds and can easily be shown by adding an extra student (who prefers school se′ most but has the lowest priority at all schools) and an extra school (which is the least preferred by all students) to the example in the original proof. We regret the error.NotesWe thank Kentaro Tomoeda for pointing out the error in corollary 2. Previous articleNext article DetailsFiguresReferencesCited by Journal of Political Economy Volume 128, Number 11November 2020 Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/710554 Views: 1742 HistoryPublished online October 07, 2020 © 2020 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.PDF download Crossref reports no articles citing this article.Related articlesChinese College Admissions and School Choice Reforms: A Theoretical Analysis20 Dec 2016Journal of Political Economy