Abstract
ABSTRACT This article examines the erosion of economic institutions against the backdrop of democratic backsliding, focusing on the Turkish case since the early 2010s. Drawing on the cases of the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey (CBRT) and the Turkish Competition Authority (TCA), it analyses the transformation of these institutions at both de jure and de facto levels. The article identifies specific mechanisms of institutional erosion and links them to the dynamics of democratic backsliding ushered by the successive governments of the Justice and Development Party (AKP). It offers a periodization of erosion, demonstrating how the verticalization of decision-making, top-down centralization, and cooptation is reflected in the cases of CBRT and TCA. The article discusses the prevalence of continuity regarding politicization and cooptation of economic institutions in the context of the 2023 General Elections, notwithstanding some policy changes.
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