Abstract
Abstract The war of 1998–2000 waged between Eritrea and Ethiopia had a peculiar irony: the respective governments of the rival nations, the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) of Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, and the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) led by President Isaias Afewerki, were former allies, who had driven the dictator Mengistu Haile Mariam from Addis Abeba in 1991. Yet, even during that conflict, the condescending attitude of the veteran Eritrean fighters towards the less experienced Tigrean People's Liberation Front (who had gone on to establish the EPRDF) had often caused friction. So too did the Eritrean vision of their own future as an independent nation, confirmed by popular vote in 1993, that ran counter to Ethiopian hopes for confederation. By 1997, landlocked Ethiopia smarted over the costs now incurred in accessing the Eritrean ports of Assab and Mitsiwa. Meanwhile, in the Eritrean capital of Asmara, there was concern as the EPRDF strove to regulate the entire regional economy. The Ethiopians refused to accept parity between their currency, the birr , and the new Eritrean nakfa . There was another element to the growing tension: their border was poorly demarcated and sovereignty over much territory remained disputed. When war finally came, the United Nations (UN), the European Union (EU), and the Organization of African Unity (OAU) would all prove humiliatingly impotent as two of the poorest countries in the world squandered millions of dollars on expensive military equipment. For the Eritreans and Ethiopians themselves, the conflict had one more terrible irony: it killed tens of thousands; it displaced hundreds of thousands; it settled nothing.
Published Version
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