Equity of access to higher education in the context of South–South cooperation in Latin America: a pluri-scalar analysis

This paper sets out to explain the highly uneven breakthrough of the “populist” or “contestatory” left during the “left turn” in Latin America since the late 1990s. Extant attempts to explain why moderate left parties that resemble the traditional social democratic mass parties have emerged in some countries, and populist left parties in others have been inconclusive. I argue that populist anti-establishment mobilization falls on fruitful ground where party systems do not adequately represent citizen preferences. This is a necessary, though not a sufficient condition for populist success. Combining data on party positions with mass-level surveys for two cases where new anti-establishment parties that have been successful and two cases of failure, I analyze how well parties represent voters along the two most salient dimensions of political competition in Latin America: the economic antagonism between state and market, and the regime dimension that pits democrats (or those in favor of deepening democracy) against those holding positive evaluations of past military dictatorships. At the party level, I use data from the Salamanca Parliamentary Elites Surveys (PELA) and from the Brazilian Legislative Surveys. At the voter level, I rely on the World Values Survey (WVS) and the Latinobarometro surveys. I first locate parties and voters on the dimensions mentioned above and then use an innovative measure to assess party system responsiveness. The paper shows that party systems in Venezuela and Bolivia lacked responsiveness prior to Hugo Chavez and Evo Morales’ successful bids for the presidency. In Chile, and to a lesser degree in Brazil, on the other hand, the close correspondence between voter preferences and party positions along the economic and political regime divides explains why new anti-establishment actors have not been successful. Looking at the evolution of party system responsiveness during the “left turn” questions the simple dichotomization of left parties into moderate and populist camps, however. While responsiveness improved substantially after the emergence of the Movement for Socialism (MAS) in Bolivia, it remains poor in Venezuela after Chavez came to power. Likewise, there are persistent differences in terms of representation in Chile and Brazil, both of which belong to the moderate left group. Beyond the initial expectations, the results thus show two pathways of the left to power in Latin America in the new millennium: A programmatic or “segmented” and a “majoritarian” path. Populist actors clearly pursue majoritarian strategies, but some non-populist actors do as well, as the Brazilian case shows.

This paper analyses the current scenario of regional economic integration in Latin America. Thus, it is argued that economic integration in this region is currently developing in three axes: an open integration axis (represented by the Pacific Alliance); a revisionist axis (symbolized by the Southern Common Market – Mercosur) and an anti-systemic axis (represented by the Bolivarian Alliance for the People of our America – ALBA). In each of these initiatives, diverse models of regional economic integration have been adopted. The relation between the current regionalist axes and the diverse models of economic integration in Latin America is discussed in the paper. Similarly, the paper evaluates the extent to which extra-regional initiatives, such as the European Union, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) have also influenced on the models of economic integration in Latin America.

The Economic System in Latin America and the Caribbean: a commitment to the development of the region's Nations.- The Latin American Integration Association.- The Union of South American Nations: An Emerging Regional Organization.- Latin American Subregional Development Institutions.- The Andean Community of Nations.- The Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR).- The Alliance of the Pacific: A New Instrument of Latin American and Caribbean Economic Integration?.- The Caribbean Community (CARICOM).- The Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States.

This article analyzes the populist rise, the extreme right-wing progress, the extreme nationalism resurgence, the xenophobia, in a historical context of liberal democratic deficit. As it disappoints, anti-liberalism grows. All these conglomerate, from right to left, it brings together the political and cultural anti-liberalism, which is part of a long tradition of thoughts which exist like a political force and a cultural climate. It is a group of phenomena which encompasses anti-liberalism philosophies. Particularly, the new Latin American political scenarios of the centre-left cycle are studied, headed by Hugo Chavez with the “Socialism of the 21st Century” in Venezuela, and Rafael Correa with the “Citizens’ Revolution” in Ecuador. Nowadays, political analysts and some regional scholars talk about the end of a cycle. Is it the end of the populism cycle in Latin America when populism resurge in Europe and the United States? As a matter of fact, Evo Morales in Bolivia and Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua are the only ones who remain on the Latin-American progressive cycle. In principle, populism is a minority force in electoral terms, since Dilma Rousseff in Brazil, Tabaré Vázquez in Uruguay and Michelle Bachelet in Chile separated from the power. The progressive sectors characterise the present Latin-American process like the backward left and a new forward right. The changing trend started when Mauricio Macri won the Argentine elections at the end of 2015, and it is reasserted with Sebastian Piñera’s triumph in Chile in December 2017. For this tendency to be consolidated, it should be awaited the elections on the three countries which conform 70% Latin-American electorate: Brazil, Mexico and Colombia; which will take place over the course of 2018. These are the explored scenarios to broaden the democratic reality of the 21st century.

Abstract. This paper discusses the determinants of health and education in Latin America, a region which we define as consisting of the following twenty countries: Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, Paraguay, Suriname, Uruguay, and Venezuela. Health and education are integral factors to the productive capability and overall well-being of individuals. Therefore the factors that contribute to health and education lay the foundation for long-term economic growth that is distributed equitably throughout every socioeconomic stratum. There are a myriad of factors that contribute to the levels of health and the quality of education experienced by individuals living in Latin America; the determinants of health will be organized such that they fall into economic, social and historical, environmental, and biological categories, while the determinants of education will be broken down into student-side, school-level, and system-wide or macro variables. Using a panel of the twenty Latin American countries previously listed, this paper will discuss possible influences of health and education status as well as the nature of that influence; the paper will then proceed to discern between statistically significant and statistically insignificant factors. The paper will conclude with a discussion of possible statistical flaws that could result in biased conclusions. Keywords. Health, Education, Latin America, HIV, Panel data. JEL. I15, I25, C33.

Introduction: Five years into the 2030 Agenda, education in Latin America continues to face persistent inequalities in access, quality, and equity. Objective: Analyze the progress and challenges in the implementation of the 2030 Agenda in the education system, considering the impact of the adopted policies, the resources invested, and the obstacles that have hindered sustained progress. Methods: The study was based on a documentary review, analyzing academic and documentary sources categorized into access, equity, financing, and digitalization to compare trends and educational policies. Results: The findings show progress in coverage and digitalization, but inequalities in educational equity, financing, and infrastructure persist. The digital divide and lack of teacher training continue to affect educational quality. Conclusions: Despite advancements in digitalization and coverage, persistent inequalities limit educational transformation. Without sustained investment and equitable strategies, Latin America will not fully achieve SDG 4 by 2030.

This study examines the recent marked slowdown in bank credit to the private sector in Latin America. Based on a study of eight countries – Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Peru, Mexico, and Venezuela – the magnitude of the slowdown is documented, comparing it to historical behavior and to similar episodes in other regions of the world. Second, changes in bank balance sheets are examined to determine whether the credit slowdown is merely a reflection of a downturn in bank deposits or whether the asset side has changed. Third, following an econometric disequilibrium approach used in recent studies of bank credit in East Asia and Finland, the paper investigates the possible causes in three countries: Colombia, Mexico, and Peru. While both supply and demand factors appear to have played key roles, their relative importance has varied across the three countries.

Pour illustrer la question du rapport entre l’État et l’économie solidaire (ES) en Amérique latine, nous présentons deux études de cas, celle du Venezuela et celle du Brésil, toutes deux considérées comme novatrices dans le domaine. Dans ces pays, le secteur de l’ES est aujourd’hui en pleine expansion et des politiques publiques émergent à destination de ce champ. Toutefois, les dynamiques impulsées par l’État dans la structuration du mouvement d’ES y sont opposées. Dans un cas, la construction de la politique publique suit une approche top-down et de nombreuses initiatives d’ES sont le fruit d’une politique volontariste de l’État. Dans l’autre, la politique publique est le fruit d’une relation de concertation entre le gouvernement et le mouvement social d’ES, qui a progressivement conquis une place dans l’espace public. Dans l’article, nous présentons ces deux processus d’institutionnalisation et tirons des conclusions transversales relatives aux défis concernant le développement du secteur de l’ES et sa relation à l’État ou à d’autres institutions.

The production of housing is an important activity for capitalist accumulation and one of the foci of conflict around the appropriation of space. Historically, this required state regulation by various means, including, housing policies. Although it is something present in all socio-spatial formations, the way in which production and regulation of the sector take place in different spaces depends, at bottom, on the ongoing accumulation pattern. Based on this methodological assumption, this article seeks is, in the light of the critical theory of underdevelopment, to analyze the current characteristics and limitations of housing policies in the continent of Latin America. Given the variety of ongoing experiences, the discussion will be centered on the Minha Casa Minha Vida (My House My Life) (Brazil) and Gran Mision Vivienda (Venezuela) programs as being two paradigmatic models of the production of a city. It is said that there are three main differences between these two programs: the subsidy schemes and funding instruments; land policy; and the state's relationship with the fractions of capital that determines the pattern of the policies of the countries.

The persistence of inequities in health, with poor and other disadvantaged population groups bearing a disproportionately high burden of ill-health, remains a public health, ethical and human rights challenge.1 The WHO Constitution enshrines equity thus: “The enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health is one of the fundamental rights of every human being without distinction of race, religion, political belief, economic or social condition.” Addressing inequities in health has been a central concern of development aid and government policies. The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) have further galvanized efforts to eliminate poverty and to reduce inequities. There has been a quantum increase in the published literature on health inequities, and “pro-poor” programmes have been initiated to redress them. Yet consensus is lacking on many aspects of inequity — its conceptual and operational definitions, its classification criteria and ways to alleviate it. Most professionals accept that inequities are “differences which are unnecessary and avoidable, but in addition are considered unfair and unjust”.2 However, some argue that it is impossible to formulate irrefutable criteria by which health inequities can be recognized.3 Moreover, they assert, what is viewed as unjust or unfair may depend on subjective values, political ideologies or normative considerations.3 Others say “pro-poor” policies oversimplify the problem by focusing only on income disparities, thus ignoring more intricate structural factors which underlie the inequity dynamics in a given context.4 The evidence from six countries (Cambodia, the Dominican Republic, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya and Tajikistan) indicates that differences in health outcomes by ethnic group, educational attainment and region were more pronounced than the differences caused by wealth, the factor which work on inequity generally addresses.4 Against this backdrop, Gillespie et al.5 examine through an equity lens the prevailing differences by wealth quintile in total fertility, unwanted fertility, use of modern contraceptives and access to family planning services in developing countries. More specifically, they consider whether unwanted fertility among the poor compared with wealthier population segments is a case of an inequality (that is, a difference that has no moral implications) or an inequity. Using data from Demographic and Health Surveys in 41 developing countries, the authors conclude that for reproduction and family planning interventions, the equity concept needs to be “applied more cautiously than in the case with health”. They further state that this equity analysis is useful in countries where poor segments have high actual and unwanted fertility, low contraceptive use and limited access to family planning information or services. By extending the equity analysis to fertility and modern contraceptive use by wealth quintile, Gillespie et al. have broadened the discourse on inequities. The countries included in the study show a range from low to high fertility and modern contraceptive use. However, the equity analysis proved useful only for countries with high fertility and low contraceptive use. It is unclear whether this implies that the equity framework has limited application or whether family planning programmes in other countries have succeeded in reducing inequities in fertility. A cross-national comparative analysis omits country-specific social, cultural and economic peculiarities which may mediate the impact of inequities. Also, wealth indices across countries in absolute terms do not indicate how poor the poorest quintile is in one country compared to another. A country-specific analysis would permit a better understanding of linkages at the individual level, rather than the macro-level broad associations found in this study. Moreover, additional information on factors such as social marketing, social health insurance and public financing of services can also be considered, together with other information on variables relating to fertility and family planning. Perhaps the most significant findings are the persistent differentials in access to and use of modern contraceptives by wealth quintile, especially in sub-Saharan Africa but also in some countries in other regions. Public-sector family planning programmes have existed for nearly 50 years and have received major international and national funding. By providing free or subsidized services and through innovative social marketing and other initiatives, family planning programmes aim to reduce inequity in access to services. Effective family planning programmes reduce the fertility differential between the wealthiest and the poorest quintiles and make a major contribution to poverty reduction.6 Impressive achievements in reducing fertility and increasing contraception have been noted.7 However, success has continued to elude much of sub-Saharan Africa, where inequities in health, fertility and contraception are most pronounced. Long-term commitment and investment are needed to provide culturally appropriate interventions to remove these inequities. Much progress needs to be made to redress inequity in access to family planning services in order to reach the MDG target of “universal access to reproductive health by 2015”.7 Further work at the country level will help clarify the dynamics of prevailing inequities and enable effective interventions by taking into account contextual factors. ■

In the last years we have been hearing a lot about a ‘turn to the Left’ in Latin America. The talk has primarily been about countries like Venezuela, Ecuador, and Bolivia, and also about Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, and Paraguay. They are given as examples of countries undergoing deep socio-economic, political, and cultural transformations. Honduras did not make it on to the list, not until recently with the coup d’etat of June 2009 and the mass resistance movement that formed in its aftermath. Its adherence to the Boliviarian Alliance for the Americas or ALBA in 2008 passed unnoticed, as much else that had been happening in the country for decades. This in part explains why the coup sent shock waves throughout Latin America. There has been a lot of contradictory commentary about the coup in Honduras in terms of what it means for the social experimentation that has been taking place in other countries. Does the coup mean that we are entering “neo-golpismo” or an unstoppable chain of coups in the region that will restore US hegemony and destroy the “Socialismo del Siglo XXI”? Or perhaps the contrary, the global rejection of the coup in Honduras demonstrates the political muscle that the New Leftist regimes have developed and reveals the weakness of US power in the region. Others interpreted the coup in Honduras even as a coup against the US president Obama, as his early reactions to the coup revealed some fissures between the presidency and the Pentagon. For some (particularly the right-wing in the US) Obama himself could be seen as part of the turn to the Left in the western hemisphere, as the first African-American president in the US to be seen en par with Evo Morales, the first Amerindian president in Latin America. And yet as more US-backed coup

Project Summary: The book for which this data collection was generated seeks to explain why democracies and authoritarian regimes have emerged and then survived or fallen in Latin America from 1945 to 2005. The more specific goal of the data collection is to assess the impact of normative orientations towards democracy and radical policy preferences on the likelihood of democratic transitions and democratic breakdowns. Most theories postulate that regimes survive or fall depending on the behavior of political actors. As the authors tested hypotheses based on competing theories, they became convinced that actors’ normative preferences about democracy and dictatorship and their policy preferences were indeed crucial variables to understand why democracies and dictatorships emerge and then survive or break down. They found that normative regime preferences and radicalism, together with international conditions, are the most important predictors for democratic emergence and survival in Latin America. Data Abstract: The absence of systematic historical measures of normative regime preferences (ideological support for democracy or authoritarianism) and of policy radicalism for major political actors led the authors to commission a set of reports covering all Latin American countries after World War II up to 2010 The reports were produced between 2008 and 2013 with the help of 19 research assistants (RAs) by archival research and synthesis of existing material (notes based on secondary sources subsequently integrated into country reports). The data collection includes all of these reports as well as the coding rules guiding their production. For eighteen of the twenty countries, the coding of political actors covers the period from 1944 until 2010; for Argentina and El Salvador reports reach back to 1916 and 1927, respectively. The data are organized by country (documents for Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela) and by administration (sections within documents). For most administrations, a limited number of actors (between two and ten) were the decisive political players. The list always includes the president (except for a few puppet presidents), political parties, trade unions, military factions, social movements, and other powerful organizations. For 290 presidential administrations, the dataset has 1460 actors including 573 parties, party coalitions, and party factions; 327 presidents and the organizations that are relatively subordinate to them (such as their parties under democracies and almost always the military under military dictatorships); 175 militaries, military factions, and military organizations; 82 business organizations; 56 guerrilla organizations; 53 popular and civil society organizations; 52 labor unions and federations; 52 powerful individuals who were not the president; 27 churches; 22 social movements; 16 paramilitary groups; and a smaller number of other kinds of actors. The authors identified the actors’ political alignments vis-a-vis the incumbent president by coding whether they were the government or government allies, members of the opposition, or neutral or divided with regards to the administration. Based on multiple historical sources, country reports discuss and code three variables for each political actor: its normative preference for democracy, its normative preference for dictatorship, and its policy radicalism/moderation. The coding rules for normative preferences for democracy and dictatorship are designed to distinguish between instrumental and normative reasons for supporting regimes. Files Description: Twenty country reports, divided into sections corresponding to the administrations in office during 1944-2010, with additional administrations for Argentina (1916-1930) and El Salvador (1927-1943). Each section (administration or period for long-lasting administrations) contains a sub-section for the actors mentioned above. An additional table summarizes the profile of all political actors discussed for each administration period. For each actor, the report provides brief narratives involving qualitative assessment of three attributes: (1) The actor’s normative support for democracy. The actor’s normative support for dictatorship; (2) The actor’s degree of radicalism on policy issues; (3) Historical sources referenced for each document are listed at the end of each respective country report.

El tema de este ensayo se ubica en los estudios actuales sobre calidad de la educación y, en este caso, la calidad asociada al desempeño docente, esta relación aparece contextualizada en América Latina. El propósito que se sigue con este trabajo es argumentar la significación y el lugar que ocupa el desempeño docente como factor directamente asociado a la calidad educativa. Se sostienen algunas ideas básicas: a saber, América Latina no ha satisfecho metas elementales en cuanto a equidad y justicia en el acceso a la educación, lo que representa un lastre en el trabajo por la calidad de este servicio; la calidad educativa está asociada a un conjunto de factores entre los que se cuentan los factores económicos, políticos, culturales, científicos y tecnológicos, así como un importante factor humano: el desempeño docente, que resulta vital según la postura que se sostiene. En ese orden, se señalan las limitaciones que se presentan hoy en el proceso de formación inicial y continua del personal docente, así como los desafíos que debe encarar como parte de su desempeño para brindar una respuesta coherente que implica una educación de calidad en el presente siglo y los cambios sociales, culturales y tecnológicos que se viven a diario. Este ensayo es la expresión de una sistematización teórica, sobre la base de consultas de diversas fuentes sobre el tema, en la que se resaltan, por su valor, informes de organismos internacionales.

The causalities between carbon dioxide emissions, renewable and non-renewable energy consumption, economic growth, and urbanisation were examined for the panel of five countries (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Venezuela) from Southern Common Market, over thirty-five years (1980–2014), using a panel vector autoregression. The empirical analysis pointed to the existence of bi-directional causality between the consumption of fossil fuels, economic growth, consumption of renewable energy, and carbon dioxide emissions; and a uni-directional relationship between the consumption of renewable energy and urbanisation. The research also proves that the countries from Southern Common Market are dependent on fossil fuels consumption and that urbanisation process is highly linked with the consumption of this type of energy. Additionally, it was found that these countries have low renewable energy participation in their energy mix. Nevertheless, a substitutability effect between the consumption of renewable energy and the consumption of fossil fuels, as a possible response to periods of scarcity in reservoirs, was detected. Policymakers of Southern Common Market countries should speed up the deep reforms regarding renewable energy to mitigate environmental degradation.

Horizontal inequality by ethnic group has remained remarkably persistent for wealth, education, and access to certain services in Nigeria. While significant gains in the reduction of inequality and improvement in access have been made for more locally administered services, outcomes are stickier and largely divergent for wealth, education, and historically federally administered services like grid-based power access. Notable is the increasing or stagnant inequality of access to these measures in the northwest and northeast ethnic/geopolitical zones and a remarkable divergence for wealth outcomes for these two zones versus the rest of the country over the 1990–2013. This paper explores different explanations for the patterns observed and puts forth the thesis that persistent inequality in access to education and federally administered services is in large part driven by historical heterogeneous federal government policy towards different groups in Nigeria.