Abstract
ABSTRACT The equilibrium balking behavior of customers and some effective regulation measures in a multi-server queueing system with a threshold policy are mostly investigated in this paper. We consider four information levels: entirely visible, nearly visible, nearly invisible and entirely invisible. For each case, we compare the equilibrium and socially optimal balking strategies of customers, formulate pricing strategy and analyze the revenue of the system manager. It is found that no matter what information level, there always exist the optimal thresholds that maximize the optimal social welfare and the system manager’s revenue, respectively. Moreover, how much information the customers know has influence on the optimal social welfare. Such findings can provide guidance for the social planner to formulate pricing strategies, make appropriate threshold policies and decide what information should be disclosed to customers to improve the optimal social welfare.
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