Abstract
ABSTRACT The topic for this paper is the apparent value incommensurability – two goods are apparently incommensurable when it appears that neither is better than the other nor are they equally good. I consider three theories of this phenomenon. Indeterminists like Broome [Broome, John. 1997. “Is Incommensurability Vagueness?” In Incommensurability, Incomparability and Practical Reason, edited by Ruth Chang. Harvard University Press.] hold that it is due to vagueness: when two goods appear to be incommensurable, this owes to the fact that ‘better than’ is vague. Incommensurabilists like Chang [Chang, Ruth. 2002. “The Possibility of Parity.” Ethics 112 (4): 659–688.] hold that some goods appear to be incommensurable because they genuinely are, because it is determinate that neither is better than the other, nor are they equally good. I defend epistemicism, the view that the appearance of value incommensurability is due only to our ignorance of how goods compare. In reality, all goods are commensurable. I offer two arguments for epistemicism. First, epistemicists are committed to less unexplained axiological structure than are non-epistemicists, Second, only epistemicists have an adequate explanation of some facts about the scope of apparent incommensurability. Finally, I identify a class of putative counterexamples to the epistemicist’s analysis..
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