Abstract

When subjects violate epistemic standards or norms, we sometimes judge them blameworthy rather than blameless. For instance, we might judge a subject blameworthy for dogmatically continuing to believe a claim even after receiving evidence which undermines it. Indeed, the idea that one may be blameworthy for belief is appealed to throughout the contemporary epistemic literature. In some cases, a subject seems blameworthy for believing as she does even though it seems prima facie implausible that she is morally blameworthy or professionally blameworthy. Such cases raise the question of whether one can be blameworthy for a belief in a specifically epistemic sense rather than in some already recognised sense, such as being morally or professionally blameworthy. A number of authors have recently argued that there is a moral or social sense in which one ought to conform one’s beliefs to the evidence (e.g. Goldberg, Graham, Vanderheiden). In this paper, I argue that even while accepting that there are moral and social norms governing belief, there are cases in which a subject is blameworthy for a belief but isn’t plausibly morally or socially blameworthy. If this latter view is correct, then we may need to develop a new account of blame which can be applied to beliefs which are not morally or socially blameworthy.

Highlights

  • When subjects violate epistemic standards or norms, we sometimes judge them blameworthy rather than blameless

  • Throughout the paper, I will be assuming that one can be blameworthy for a belief to focus on the question of whether one can be blameworthy for a belief in a epistemic sense–for violating a norm specifying what doxastic states one epistemically ought to have

  • The idea that a subject may be blameworthy for her beliefs is widely appealed to throughout a range of contemporary epistemic debates concerning justification, knowledge, defeat, higher-order evidence, akrasia and peer disagreement

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Summary

Introduction

When subjects violate epistemic standards or norms, we sometimes judge them blameworthy rather than blameless. The cases are examples in which a subject is blameworthy in an epistemic sense, that she is blameworthy for violating the norm that one epistemically ought to conform one’s doxastic states to the evidence. This initial case needs strengthening if it is to establish that subjects can be blameworthy in an epistemic sense. Goldberg claims that ‘‘epistemic norms themselves are grounded in and reflect the legitimate social (epistemic) expectations we have of one another’’ (2018: 2) On either of these views, someone might attempt to accommodate the cases by holding that the subject is blameworthy in an already established sense, such as being morally blameworthy. I conclude that subjects may be blameworthy for their beliefs in a epistemic sense

Blameworthy and blameless belief
Deriving epistemic norms from moral norms
A moral duty to meet others’ information needs
A moral duty to assert only what one’s evidence supports
A social duty to meet epistemic expectations
Conclusion
There are some exceptions

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