Norms of Trust

Abstract

Norms are instructions how to act. Their form is the imperative or hypothetical imperative: ‘Do X’, ‘Don’t do X’, or ‘if Y, then do X’. There are moral norms, epistemic norms, norms of practical rationality, and social norms. In following norms we come to believe truths, to be justified in our belief, act rationally, lead a virtuous life, and act in morally permissible ways. In following social norms we come to lead a life that is acceptable to a given society, a life that conforms to this socially established way of living. Social norms thereby differ from other norms in that their prescriptions are relative rather than universal. At the most trivial level these norms can be no more than a matter of etiquette: they are a matter of adopting the right register, wearing the right clothes, or, for instance, using the outermost knife and fork first. In these matters most would accept that when in Rome one should do as the Romans do. But this easy-going relativism towards the prescriptions of social norms is not always so easy: social norms can be strongly felt. And nor are all social norms trivial: adopting the right register, for instance, can shade into treating someone the right way and thereby engage moral norms. Similarly, prescriptions of politeness can overlap with epistemic prescriptions. ‘Believe people’ might be a matter of politeness, but it could also be an epistemic norm if truth-telling were the norm. Is ‘tell the truth’ a social norm, and so the norm? Should we believe people? This chapter aims to argue that, roughly speaking, we have these social norms. It aims to offer an explanation of these social norms and an account of how this bears on epistemological theories of testimony as a source of knowledge.