Abstract
ABSTRACT This paper argues that epistemic smothering is not a form of epistemic paternalism. In this sense, it refutes the claim recently made by Valerie Chock and Jonathan Matheson, who defend epistemic smothering as epistemically permissible form of epistemic paternalism. After an outline of what is meant by epistemic paternalism and epistemic smothering, based on the work by Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij and Kristie Dotson on these topics, the paper argues against the identification of epistemic smothering as a form of epistemic paternalism. In the conclusion, it also calls for a reconsideration of how exactly to conceive of epistemic paternalism.
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