Epistemic justification and epistemic luck

Job De Grefte

doi:10.1007/s11229-016-1306-7

Abstract

Among epistemologists, it is not uncommon to relate various forms of epistemic luck to the vexed debate between internalists and externalists. But there are many internalism/externalism debates in epistemology, and it is not always clear how these debates relate to each other. In the present paper I investigate the relation between epistemic luck and prominent internalist and externalist accounts of epistemic justification. I argue that the dichotomy between internalist and externalist concepts of justification can be characterized in terms of epistemic luck. Whereas externalist theories of justification are incompatible with veritic luck but not with reflective luck, the converse is true for internalist theories of justification. These results are found to explain and cohere with some recent findings from elsewhere in epistemology, and support a surprising picture of justification, on which internalism and externalism are complementary rather than contradictory positions.

Highlights

Among epistemologists, it is not uncommon to relate various forms of epistemic luck to the vexed debate between internalists and externalists
I argue that the dichotomy between internalist and externalist concepts of justification can be characterized in terms of epistemic luck
Whereas externalist theories of justification are incompatible with veritic luck but not with reflective luck, the converse is true for internalist theories of justification

Summary

Epistemic luck

This paper is based on Duncan Pritchard’s modal account of luck (2005, 2014). Pritchard’s main claim is that “what makes an event lucky is that while it obtains in the actual world, there are—keeping the initial conditions for that event fixed—close possible worlds in which this event does not obtain” (2014, p. 599). We can accommodate lucky guesses of necessary truth by extending the account of veritic luck to include the possibility of the formation of different false beliefs by the same method. Even if this is the case, since they are massively deceived by the demon, the way the beliefs of the demon’s victims are produced in their world could have very produced a false belief If their beliefs are true at all, they will be veritically lucky. The New Evil Demon case serves to illustrate that what matters for reflective luck is not whether the method one used in forming one’s belief could have produced a false one, but rather whether the method that one believes one used could have done so. Modal distance is not determined relative to the actual world in the case of reflective luck, but relative to what the agent believes to be the actual world, and what she believes to be possible

Externalism and luck

Internalism and luck

Implications