Social and Anti-Social Justification: A Study of Lehrer’s Epistemology

Abstract

Keith Lehrer has advanced understanding of almost every issue in epistemology. This makes the task of surveying his epistemology rewarding but difficult. I concentrate of Lehrer’s general account of epistemic justification, as expressed in Knowledge and later work, on the metaepistemic concerns reflected in his decision-theoretic approach to epistemic problems, and on the relations between epistemic justification and knowledge.1 I say little directly about Lehrer’s work on induction or the fourth conditions for knowledge he has proposed to meet Gettier problems. I limit my discussion of fourth conditions for knowledge because I find in Lehrer’s writings the core of a sounder and richer approach to Gettier and related problems. There is a concern in the early pages of Knowledge with social factors in epistemic justification, but this concern dissipates as the book proceeds.2 I think that Lehrer should have pursued this concern. Thus I conclude this essay by shaping Lehrer’s interest in social factors into a proposal for meeting Gettier and related problems concerning knowledge and justification in a conceptually novel and, hopefully, satisfactory way.