Epistemic Intuition and Experimental Philosophy

Abstract

Abstract This chapter considers the skeptical objection to epistemic intuition that is based on experimental philosophy, which aims to use the methods of cognitive science to conduct experimental investigations of the psychological processes underlying people’s intuitions about central philosophical issues. Section 1 carefully lays out this objection, identifying the crucial premises on which it relies. Section 2 considers how strong this objection needs to be if it is to be successful, arguing that stronger objections are needed if the beliefs the objections are intended to undermine are rationally held with a high degree of confidence (as appears to be the case with the beliefs based on epistemic intuition that are targeted by this objection). Section 3 examines the objection from experimental philosophy in detail, noting that each of its crucial premises faces serious challenges, with the result that it is not strong enough to undermine the intuitionist particularist anti-skeptic’s reliance on epistemic intuitions. Section 4 draws together the various argumentative strands in the book and situates the book’s conclusions in a moderate commonsense tradition that avoids the extremes of both dogmatism and radical skepticism.