Abstract

AbstractRefining and extending Cassam's important account of the vice of epistemic insouciance, I distinguish between expressive and receptive forms of it. Focusing on the latter, I discuss its perniciousness. I then delineate a virtue and a vice that have hitherto not been discussed in the literature: epistemic souciance and epistemic hypersouciance.

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