Abstract
This paper studies strategic games in which the beliefs of each player are represented by a set of probability measures satisfying a parametric specialization that is called ϵ-contamination. That is, beliefs are represented by a set of probability measures, where every measure in the set has the form (1− ϵ) p*+ ϵp, p* being the benchmark probability measure, p being a contamination, and ϵ reflecting the amount of error in p* that is deemed possible. Under a suitably modified common prior assumption, if beliefs about opponents’ action choices are common knowledge, then beliefs satisfy some properties that can be interpreted as agreement and stochastic independence.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
