Abstract
We consider a strategic situation in which each player may not know the probability distribution governing the information structures of his opponents, and consequently his beliefs about opponents' action choices are represented by a set of probability measures. Suppose that beliefs of all the players are common knowledge. Then for any subset of players, the marginal beliefs of those players (about the action choices of their common opponents) must share at least one probability measure.
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