Abstract
Epistemic entitlement is a species of internalist warrant that can be had without any evidential support. Unfortunately, for this kind of warrant the so-called problem of demarcation arises, a form of epistemic relativism. I first present entitlement theory and examine what the problem of demarcation is exactly, rejecting that it is either based on bizarreness or disagreement in favour of the thesis that the problem of demarcation is based on epistemic arbitrariness. Second, I argue that arbitrariness generates a problem for entitlement because it undermines epistemic warrant. Third, I draw out some of the consequences that arbitrariness has for an entitlement epistemology, notably that it threatens to generalise to all our beliefs. Finally, I examine how different solutions to the problem of demarcation fare with respect to the danger of arbitrariness. I argue that none of the considered options succeeds in dealing with the risks of arbitrariness.
Highlights
The idea that it is epistemically permissible to trust something to be true, without having evidence for it, has gained traction among internalists in recent years
The questions I want to ask in this paper are: first, what exactly generates the problem of demarcation? Second, how is it a problem? As an example, consider a religious fundamentalist who has the hinge that the Bhagavad Gita is a reliable source of information
(C1) If hinges are adopted arbitrarily, they are not warranted. If this is the problem of demarcation, it may prove devastating to epistemic entitlement
Summary
The idea that it is epistemically permissible to trust something to be true, without having evidence for it, has gained traction among internalists in recent years. On Wright’s view, we have two kinds of epistemic warrant: evidential justification for regular beliefs and entitlement to accept hinges which are a necessary presupposition for investigation. We need the latter kind, entitlement, in order to be able to get the more familiar evidential justification. A problem arises for accounts of epistemic entitlement Wright calls it the “problem of demarcation”, and he puts it as follows: The point has not gone away that it is not in general, or even usually, consistent with responsible belief management to accept things without evidence or relevant cognitive achievement. I will examine how the different solutions to the problem of demarcation that have been suggested until now fare under the arbitrariness reading of the problem of demarcation
Sign-in/Register to view highlights & summary Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Free) 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a call
