Abstract
In the preceding chapters I have outlined a social externalist theory of epistemic entitlement. I took the standard account, consisting of a cluster of theses about epistemic entitlements from the current literature and departed from it by construing epistemic entitlement in terms of the publicly observable conditions that ground it rather than as a (weakly) internalist epistemic status. While the standard account regards perceptual states as a prerequisite for entitlement, the social externalist account holds that entitlements are grounded in a certain kind of perceptual situation. The experience condition and the rationality requirement feature only as negative conditions in the social externalist account. Being in the right kind of perceptual situation is the default condition for an entitlement: once you are in such a position you have a right to believe (and others have the right to attribute an entitlement to you) without providing justification, unless a challenge condition is indicated.KeywordsTrue BeliefEpistemic StatusChallenge ConditionDefault ConditionPerceptual BeliefThese keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.
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