Encouraging the Submission of Information by Reducing Confirming Costs

Abstract

When a landslide occurs, the person who discovers it will likely report the disaster; however, a person who receives this report will likely need someone on site to check, since the reporter may have misread the information. This allows third parties to make use of the confirmed information. Facilitating such mechanisms for reporting, confirming, and utilizing disaster information is considered to be necessary for sharing details about one. In this paper, we proposed and analyzed an agent-based model that incorporates disaster behavior into the model of Toriumi et al. The reporting of a disaster refers to submitting articles, the confirmation of the information by another person refers to commenting on the articles, and utilizing the information refers to comments responding to the aforementioned comment using the framework of meta-reward games, based on the prisoner’s dilemma game. We then analyze the costs and rewards to encourage cooperation in several social networks. It is found that reducing the cost of commenting (conforming) encourages the submission of information. The properties of the results do not depend on network structure, which is novel and unexpected, and it is expected that the properties of real social networks will be predictable.