Abstract
Supporters of the ‘perceptual model’ of emotions hold that emotional experiences can be reasons for evaluative judgements—in much the same way that sensory perceptual experiences can be reasons for our judgements about the non-evaluative world. This chapter raises doubts about the analogy between emotional and sensory perceptual experiences. The first part outlines the perceptual model. The second and third parts raise some problems for the account, suggesting that emotions are not reasons for evaluative judgements after all. And the final part contains a response to a possible objection, and an explanation of how emotional experiences can still play an important epistemic role even if they are not reasons for evaluative judgements.
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