Emotions and the content of aesthetic experience

Abstract

In this article, I will draw a parallel between the phenomenology of aesthetic experience and the concept of affective intentionality. One of my aims is to show that ?component? approach is not appropriate both for aesthetic and emotional experience. I will lay emphasis on issues of the shaping of aesthetic content and its non-conceptuality. I will respond to the first problem by introducing the elements of affective intentionality account, particularly by referring to Goldie?s argument concerning the intentionality of feelings. Furthermore, I will clarify that attitude/content distinction cannot stand for aesthetic and emotional experience. The second issue will be addressed by referring to one of interpretations regarding Kant?s account of the judgment of taste. Even if the drawn parallels don?t provide a clear argument for equating aesthetic and emotional experience, the more modest aim of the paper is to point out the lessons of affective intentionality account, which could be helpful in understanding the aesthetic experience.