Emotion, rationality, and social identity: a theoretical-methodological proposal for a cognitive approach.

Abstract

Humberto Maturana's biology of cognition and the studies of neuroscientist Antonio Damasio have proposed theories that indicate the role of emotion in cognitive processes. Emotion lies at the basis of any behavior. An emotional transition defines a transition from one domain of actions to the other, while emotions shared in human interaction define collective domains of action and thus also social identity. In this case, they may give rise to operational coherences within the same domain of action which is recognized as "rationality". The transition from one operational coherence to another within the same rationality does not therefore entail an emotional transition. This article uses this theoretical framework to propose an interpretation of the phenomenon of social identity and distinguishes social identities based only on emotions from those related to operational coherence. We call the former type of social identity "ontological", while the latter is referred to as "formal". To empirically prove the theoretical proposal of the article, the concept of metacontrast found in social self-categorization theory and its quantification elaborated by Alberto Voci are used. According to the social self-categorization theory, the greater the distance between two groups' visions of the world, the greater the metacontrast between them. Using our model, metacontrast must thus be greater for ontological social identity and less for formal social identity. Our hypothesis was confirmed by the data. This outcome allows huge applications of the methodology proposed, as exemplified in the final considerations.