Emotion and concreteness effects when learning novel concepts in the native language

While embodied approaches of cognition have proved to be successful in explaining concrete concepts and words, they have more difficulties in accounting for abstract concepts and words, and several proposals have been put forward. This work aims to test the Words As Tools proposal, according to which both abstract and concrete concepts are grounded in perception, action and emotional systems, but linguistic information is more important for abstract than for concrete concept representation, due to the different ways they are acquired: while for the acquisition of the latter linguistic information might play a role, for the acquisition of the former it is instead crucial. We investigated the acquisition of concrete and abstract concepts and words, and verified its impact on conceptual representation. In Experiment 1, participants explored and categorized novel concrete and abstract entities, and were taught a novel label for each category. Later they performed a categorical recognition task and an image-word matching task to verify a) whether and how the introduction of language changed the previously formed categories, b) whether language had a major weight for abstract than for concrete words representation, and c) whether this difference had consequences on bodily responses. The results confirm that, even though both concrete and abstract concepts are grounded, language facilitates the acquisition of the latter and plays a major role in their representation, resulting in faster responses with the mouth, typically associated with language production. Experiment 2 was a rating test aiming to verify whether the findings of Experiment 1 were simply due to heterogeneity, i.e. to the fact that the members of abstract categories were more heterogeneous than those of concrete categories. The results confirmed the effectiveness of our operationalization, showing that abstract concepts are more associated with the mouth and concrete ones with the hand, independently from heterogeneity.

Previously, multi-voxel pattern analysis has been used to decode words referring to concrete object categories. In this study we investigated if single-trial-based brain activity was sufficient to distinguish abstract (e.g., mercy) versus concrete (e.g., barn) concept representations. Multiple neuroimaging studies have identified differences in the processing of abstract versus concrete concepts based on the averaged activity across time by using univariate methods. In this study we used multi-voxel pattern analysis to decode functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) data when participants perform a semantic similarity judgment task on triplets of either abstract or concrete words with similar meanings. Classifiers were trained to identify individual trials as concrete or abstract. Cross-validated accuracies for classifying trials as abstract or concrete were significantly above chance (P < 0.05) for all participants. Discriminating information was distributed in multiple brain regions. Moreover, accuracy of identifying single trial data for any one participant as abstract or concrete was also reliably above chance (P < 0.05) when the classifier was trained solely on data from other participants. These results suggest abstract and concrete concepts differ in representations in terms of neural activity patterns during a short period of time across the whole brain.

The chapter illustrates the words as social tools (WAT) theory on abstract concepts and words. The theory has five main tenets. (1) embodiment and grounding. Both concrete and abstract concepts and words are embodied and grounded in perception, action, and emotional systems; (2) importance of language. For the representation of abstract concepts, the linguistic mediation is more crucial than for the representation of concrete ones, given that the scaffolding function of the physical environment is less powerful for abstract than for concrete concepts; (3) acquisition modality. The acquisition modality of abstract concepts and words relies more on language than the acquisition of concrete concepts and words; (4) brain representation. While both activate the sensorimotor network, the linguistic network is activated more by abstract than by concrete concepts and words. (5) linguistic diversity. Abstract concepts and words are more affected by differences between languages than concrete ones; that is, their meaning changes more depending on the cultural and linguistic milieu in which they are learned. Overall, abstract concepts do not differ from concrete ones in embodiment, but differ from them in acquisition modality, in brain representation, in variability across languages, and they are also likely to differ in the assessment of quantity. Once outlined the main principles of the theory, in the rest of the chapter we discuss the reasons of the dominance of language and the role played by labels and linguistic explanations for abstract concepts and words, as well as the possible mechanisms underlying the activation of its motor counterpart, the mouth effector.

In 4 word-translation experiments, we examined the different representational frameworks theory (Crutch & Warrington, 2005; 2010) that concrete words are represented primarily by category, whereas abstract words are represented by association. In our experiments, Chinese-English bilingual speakers were presented with an auditory Chinese word and 3 or 4 written English words simultaneously and asked to select the English word that corresponded to the auditory word. For both abstract and concrete words, higher error rates and longer response times were observed when the English words were categorically or associatively related compared to the unrelated conditions and the magnitude of the categorical effect was bigger than the associative effect. These results challenge the different representational frameworks theory and suggest that although category and association are important for representing abstract and concrete concepts, category plays a greater role for both types of words.

Behavioral and neurophysiological effects of word imageability and concreteness remain a topic of central interest in cognitive neuroscience and could provide essential clues for understanding how the brain processes conceptual knowledge. We examined these effects using event-related functional magnetic resonance imaging while participants identified concrete and abstract words. Relative to nonwords, concrete and abstract words both activated a left-lateralized network of multimodal association areas previously linked with verbal semantic processing. Areas in the left lateral temporal lobe were equally activated by both word types, whereas bilateral regions including the angular gyrus and the dorsal prefrontal cortex were more strongly engaged by concrete words. Relative to concrete words, abstract words activated left inferior frontal regions previously linked with phonological and verbal working memory processes. The results show overlapping but partly distinct neural systems for processing concrete and abstract concepts, with greater involvement of bilateral association areas during concrete word processing, and processing of abstract concepts almost exclusively by the left hemisphere.

Concepts have traditionally been categorized as either concrete (e.g., ROSE) or abstract (e.g., ROMANCE) based on whether they have a direct connection to external sensory experience or not. However, there is growing consensus that these conceptual categories differ in their reliance on various additional sources of semantic information, such as motor, affective, social, and linguistic experiences, and this is reflected in systematic differences in the semantic properties that typically contribute to their informational content. However, it remains unclear whether concrete and abstract concepts also differ in how their constituent semantic properties relate to one another. To explore this, we compared the organization of 15 semantic dimensions underlying concrete and abstract concept knowledge using data-driven network analyses. We found striking differences in both (1) the centrality of conceptual properties and (2) their pairwise partial correlations. Distinct sensorimotor dimensions emerged as pivotal in organizing each concept type: haptic information for concrete concepts, and interoception and mouth action for abstract concepts. Social content was higher in abstract concepts. However, it played a more central role in structuring concrete meanings, suggesting distinct contributions of social experience to each concept type. Age of acquisition was related exclusively to dimensions quantifying sensorimotor and affective experiences, with sensorimotor properties supporting the acquisition of concrete concepts and affective properties contributing more to the acquisition of abstract concepts. Overall, our findings offer novel insights into the interplay between the diverse sources of semantic information proposed by multiple representation theories in shaping both abstract and concrete concept knowledge.

Cognitive science has a rich history of interest in the ways that languages represent abstract and concrete concepts (e.g., idea vs. dog). Until recently, this focus has centered largely on aspects of word meaning and semantic representation. However, recent corpora analyses have demonstrated that abstract and concrete words are also marked by phonological, orthographic, and morphological differences. These regularities in sound-meaning correspondence potentially allow listeners to infer certain aspects of semantics directly from word form. We investigated this relationship between form and meaning in a series of four experiments. In Experiments 1–2 we examined the role of metalinguistic knowledge in semantic decision by asking participants to make semantic judgments for aurally presented nonwords selectively varied by specific acoustic and phonetic parameters. Participants consistently associated increased word length and diminished wordlikeness with abstract concepts. In Experiment 3, participants completed a semantic decision task (i.e., abstract or concrete) for real words varied by length and concreteness. Participants were more likely to misclassify longer, inflected words (e.g., “apartment”) as abstract and shorter uninflected abstract words (e.g., “fate”) as concrete. In Experiment 4, we used a multiple regression to predict trial level naming data from a large corpus of nouns which revealed significant interaction effects between concreteness and word form. Together these results provide converging evidence for the hypothesis that listeners map sound to meaning through a non-arbitrary process using prior knowledge about statistical regularities in the surface forms of words.

Comprehension of concrete and abstract words in patients with selective anterior temporal lobe resection and in patients with selective amygdalo-hippocampectomy

GENERAL COMMENTARY article Front. Psychol., 03 April 2014Sec. Language Sciences Volume 5 - 2014 | https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00279

Visual imagery while reading concrete and abstract Japanese kanji words: An fMRI study

It has been proposed that much of conceptual knowledge is acquired through situated conceptualization, such that both external (e.g., agents, objects, events) and internal (e.g., emotions, introspections) environments are considered important (Barsalou, 2003). To evaluate this proposal, we characterized two dimensions by which situated conceptualization may be measured and which should have different relevance for abstract and concrete concepts; namely, emotional experience (i.e., the ease with which words evoke emotional experience; Newcombe, Campbell, Siakaluk, & Pexman, 2012) and context availability (i.e., the ease with which words evoke contexts in which their referents may appear; Schwanenflugel & Shoben, 1983). We examined the effects of these two dimensions on abstract and concrete word processing in verbal semantic categorization (VSCT) and naming tasks. In the VSCT, emotional experience facilitated processing of abstract words but inhibited processing of concrete words, whereas context availability facilitated processing of both types of words. In the naming task in which abstract words and concrete words were not blocked by emotional experience, context availability facilitated responding to only the abstract words. In the naming task in which abstract words and concrete words were blocked by emotional experience, emotional experience facilitated responding to only the abstract words, whereas context availability facilitated responding to only the concrete words. These results were observed even with several lexical (e.g., frequency, age of acquisition) and semantic (e.g., concreteness, arousal, valence) variables included in the analyses. As such, the present research suggests that emotional experience and context availability tap into different aspects of situated conceptualization and make unique contributions to the representation and processing of abstract and concrete concepts.

It is generally assumed that abstract concepts are linguistically coded, in line with imaging evidence of greater engagement of the left perisylvian language network for abstract than concrete words (Binder JR, Desai RH, Graves WW, Conant LL. 2009. Where is the semantic system? A critical review and meta-analysis of 120 functional neuroimaging studies. Cerebral Cortex. 19:2767-2796; Wang J, Conder JA, Blitzer DN, Shinkareva SV. 2010. Neural representation of abstract and concrete concepts: A meta-analysis of neuroimaging studies. Hum Brain Map. 31:1459-1468). Recent behavioral work, which used tighter matching of items than previous studies, however, suggests that abstract concepts also entail affective processing to a greater extent than concrete concepts (Kousta S-T, Vigliocco G, Vinson DP, Andrews M, Del Campo E. The representation of abstract words: Why emotion matters. J Exp Psychol Gen. 140:14-34). Here we report a functional magnetic resonance imaging experiment that shows greater engagement of the rostral anterior cingulate cortex, an area associated with emotion processing (e.g., Etkin A, Egner T, Peraza DM, Kandel ER, Hirsch J. 2006. Resolving emotional conflict: A role for the rostral anterior cingulate cortex in modulating activity in the amygdala. Neuron. 52:871), in abstract processing. For abstract words, activation in this area was modulated by the hedonic valence (degree of positive or negative affective association) of our items. A correlation analysis of more than 1,400 English words further showed that abstract words, in general, receive higher ratings for affective associations (both valence and arousal) than concrete words, supporting the view that engagement of emotional processing is generally required for processing abstract words. We argue that these results support embodiment views of semantic representation, according to which, whereas concrete concepts are grounded in our sensory-motor experience, affective experience is crucial in the grounding of abstract concepts.

According to embodied and grounded theories, concepts are grounded in sensorimotor systems. The majority of evidence supporting these views concerns concepts referring to objects or actions, while evidence on abstract concepts is more scarce. Explaining how abstract concepts such as “freedom” are represented would thus be pivotal for grounded theories. According to some recent proposals, abstract concepts are grounded in both sensorimotor and linguistic experience, thus they activate the mouth motor system more than concrete concepts. Two experiments are reported, aimed at verifying whether abstract, concrete and emotional words activate the mouth and the hand effectors. In both experiments participants performed first a lexical decision, then a recognition task. In Experiment 1 participants responded by pressing a button either with the mouth or with the hand, in Experiment 2 responses were given with the foot, while a button held either in the mouth or in the hand was used to respond to catch-trials. words were slower to process in both tasks (concreteness effect). Across the tasks and experiments, emotional concepts had instead a fluctuating pattern, different from those of both concrete and abstract concepts, suggesting that they cannot be considered as a subset of abstract concepts. The interaction between type of concept (abstract, concrete and emotional) and effector (mouth, hand) was not significant in the lexical decision task, likely because it emerged only with tasks implying a deeper processing level. It reached significance, instead, in the recognition tasks. In both experiments abstract concepts were facilitated in the mouth condition compared to the hand condition, supporting our main prediction. Emotional concepts instead had a more variable pattern. Overall, our findings indicate that various kinds of concepts differently activate the mouth and hand effectors, but they also suggest that concepts activate effectors in a flexible and task-dependent way.

The Influence of Emotional Content on Event-Related Brain Potentials during Spoken Word Processing

Across disciplines, researchers are eager to gain insight into empirical features of abstract vs. concrete concepts. In this work, we provide a detailed characterisation of the distributional nature of abstract and concrete words across 16,620 English nouns, verbs and adjectives. Specifically, we investigate the following questions: (1) What is the distribution of concreteness in the contexts of concrete and abstract target words? (2) What are the differences between concrete and abstract words in terms of contextual semantic diversity? (3) How does the entropy of concrete and abstract word contexts differ? Overall, our studies show consistent differences in the distributional representation of concrete and abstract words, thus challenging existing theories of cognition and providing a more fine-grained description of their nature.