Abstract
Abstract Social Perception Theory (SPT) claims that it is possible, on occasion, to perceive that others are in pain, angry, intend to kick, or desire another helping of ice cream. According to a thesis that I call ‘Embodiment’, at least some mental states extend all the way to the available surface behaviour. The question I pursue in this chapter is whether Embodiment lends support to SPT. According to a view that I label the ‘Support Thesis’, Embodiment does support SPT in specific ways. I argue that—in the context of the mindreading debate, at any rate—the Support Thesis is false. If Embodiment turned out to be false, this would in no obvious way cast doubt on SPT. And if the former turned out to be true, this would not obviously lend any support to the latter.
Published Version
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a call