Abstract

Although the expression “form of life” and its plural “forms of life” occur only five times in Philosophical Investigations, and generally few times in his works, it is commonly agreed that this is one of the most relevant issues in Wittgenstein’s later philosophy. Starting from the analysis of the contexts in which Wittgenstein makes use of this concept, the paper focuses on the different interpretations that have been given in secondary literature, and proposes a classification based on two axes of debate: the monistic versus pluralistic interpretation, and the empirical versus transcendental interpretation. After placing some well-known readings in the resulting scheme, an attempt will be made to offer an evolutionary reading of Wittgenstein’s own ideas about forms of life. It will be argued that the empirical and plural view that seems characteristic of his writings in the Thirties, slowly appears to turn towards a monistic view, sometimes with transcendental tones, although within a pragmatic perspective. This turn remains nevertheless rooted in Wittgenstein’s general attitude towards philosophy intended as a conceptual inquiry with clarifying and therapeutic aims.

Highlights

  • One of the most debated concepts of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy is that of form of life, or, as we should say following hisAnna Boncompagni CC-BY own suggestion1, way of living

  • Starting from the analysis of the contexts in which Wittgenstein makes use of this concept, the paper focuses on the different interpretations that have been given in the secondary literature, and proposes a classification based on two axes of debate: the monistic versus pluralistic interpretation, and the empirical versus transcendental interpretation

  • This paper aims to disentangle some of the confusions characterizing the debate by highlighting the presence of two axes of dispute, which should be kept distinguished: the monistic versus pluralistic readings, and the empirical versus transcendental readings

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Summary

Introduction

One of the most debated concepts of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy is that of form of life, or, as we should say following his. Wittgenstein seems not to be interested in asserting what forms of life are Substantive idea but remains a philosophical tool, a part of Wittgenstein’s way of conceiving philosophical activity, aimed at directing our attention to the belonging of words and sense to the broader horizon of life itself

Forms of life in Philosophical Investigations
Interpretations of forms of life
Avoiding conceptual confusion
Back to Wittgenstein
Concluding remarks
Full Text
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