Abstract
This paper is an introductory exploration of the notion of âforms of lifeâ in the later philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein. The notion of âforms of lifeâ is central to understanding Wittgensteinâs later philosophy. Even though this is the case, there have been a variety of interpretations of this notion in the literature on Wittgensteinâs thought. In part this is due to Wittgensteinâs infrequent reference to âforms of lifeâ. The term âform of lifeâ only appears five times in the Philosophical Investigations, the central text of Wittgensteinâs later philosophy. It is a point of debate whether the notion of âforms of lifeâ commits Wittgenstein to a form of relativism. This paper explores this problem. We argue that it is entirely possible for members of different conceptual communities to engage in dialogue with each other on Wittgensteinâs view. We argue that Wittgenstein was not a cognitive relativist. Wittgensteinâs conviction was that truth is bound to this complicated form of life, or the fundamentally human perspective. His view of truth remains perspectival. Members of different conceptual communities can enter into dialogue. Other âforms of lifeâ are available to âusâ and members of diverse groups can change their views.
Highlights
This paper is an introductory exploration of the notion of âforms of lifeâ in the later philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein
I have suggested that the notion of âforms of lifeâ poses the question of relativism
The issue of relativism arises when we consider the idea of a plurality of âforms of lifeâ each with their own distinct and mutually exclusive âways of seeingâ the world
Summary
This paper is an introductory exploration of the notion of âforms of lifeâ in the later philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein. The notion of âforms of lifeâ is primordial for Wittgenstein. I have suggested that the notion of âforms of lifeâ poses the question of relativism.
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