Abstract
Perhaps no problem area within the philosophy of science has proven so resistant to successful explication as that of characterizing the principles and procedures of inductive (or non-demonstrative) inference. The purpose of this paper is to pursue attempts by Hempel, Hintikka, and Levi,1 among others, where inductive procedures are examined by means of the concepts and methods that distinguish decision-theoretical analyses of principles of choice, given a finite set of mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive courses of conduct.2 The most important difference between these decision-theoretical analyses and those focusing upon the acceptance and rejection of hypotheses per se is that decisions determining behavior depend upon practical utilities, whereas those determining beliefs per se depend upon theoretical (or ‘epistemic’) gains and losses. Consequently, a distinctive characteristic of investigations of the kind contemplated here is that inductive procedures are explored within the framework of a decision-theoretical model employing ‘epistemic’ utilities.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
