Electricity swing options: Behavioral models and pricing

Abstract

Abstract Electricity swing options are supply contracts for power, which give the owner the right to change the required delivery on short time notice. It gives more flexibility than fixed base load or peak load contracts. The name “option” is a bit misleading, since it gives the owner multiple exercise rights at many different time horizons with exercise amounts on a continuous scale. We look at the problem to determine a rational ask price for such a contract from the viewpoint of the contract seller. The pricing of these contracts differs drastically from the pricing of financial options. First, peculiar properties arise from the non-storability of the underlying (the energy) and therefore the impossibility to hedge with the underlying, hedging is only possible with some future contracts. Second, the behavior of the owner plays an important role. Based on some behavioral model for the option holder, we develop a game-theoretic model, which allows to identify the equilibrium price. Besides some theoretical results, we present some numerical results which clarify the dependence of the asked price on the amount of flexibility offered in the swing option.