Abstract
This article addresses the widespread notion that the decline in membership turnover in American state legislatures during the last two decades was primarily due to a decline in voluntary withdrawals from office and was unrelated to electoral competition. A theory of membership turnover is presented that incorporates electoral competition as a factor in an incumbent's decision to seek reelection and his/her ability to win. Several hypotheses are tested with data on turnover in the Indiana House of Representatives. This article departs from previous efforts in that electoral competition is measured at the district level and incumbents' decisions to run for higher office are distinguished from other forms of voluntary withdrawal.
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