El rol de las intuiciones en los experimentos mentales filosóficos

Abstract

Hypothetical and counterfactual situations appeared, at least since 1970, in substantial contributions in Analytical Philosophy. The use of this type of suppositions has been identified with the argumentative practice knowled-ged as thought experimentation. There is a variety of interpretations of the epistemology of this type of experiment. The analyzes of these practices co-incide in attributing a relevant role to the intuitions in their operation. A des-cription of a hypothetical situation invokes certain intuitions of the reader. The question: "What would happen?" it is answered almost instantaneously because some kind of unconscious reasoning takes place. For some perspec-tives, intuitions serve as evidence of the applicability of a concept or the plausibility of an explanation. Skepticism about the legitimacy of thought experiments calls into question the reliability of intuitions to justify philosophical theses. The purpose of this work is to present an overview of the discussion on the contribution to philosophical knowledge that thought experiments can make and to specify the role that intuitions have on these devices.