El presente y el futuro del Derecho Natural: una conversación con Robert P. George

Abstract

This article presents an unpublished interview with Professor Robert P. George (Princeton University, USA) with the aim of reaching out to scholars from non-Anglo-Saxon countries in order to offer a comprehensive view of the main issues currently being debated by legal and political scholars from a non-continental viewpoint. The text shows how a significant number of Anglo-Saxon scholars have recovered the discredited notion of natural law, through the so-called “New School of Natural Law”. With this new approach to natural law, George presents a clear defense of rights and institutions currently confronted by the tyranny of “the politically correct”. One powerful aspect of this new School includes the elaboration of arguments and counter-arguments to one’s own position. In this way, George invites his participant –whether in the classroom or through his dialectical works– to think for him or herself without fear of questioning even one’s deepest ideas and convictions. As a consequence of this thought process, one is able to receive new lights and, thus, rectify and reach a more complete truth. If, on the contrary, one has unsupported explanations or reasonings with logical fallacies, the method will strengthen one’s personal ideas, which must always be presented with the openness of those who do not consider themselves infallible. The main topic of this article is a detailed analysis of the natural law, as understood by the “New School of Natural Law”, in which George is inscribed as one of its main protagonists. It also presents the criticisms of which this New School is frequently the object. It should be therefore an enlightening text for jurists and philosophers interested in knowing first¬hand the principles of this School, still not widespread in the continental tradition. Another aspect of interest is the exposition of the methodology that, according to George, should guide Constitutional Interpretation. For jurists not fully internalized in the tradition of Anglo-Saxon Common Law, his explanation of how judges should proceed when resolving different cases is insightful. The judges must be limited, says George, to the role that the Constitution has assigned to them: to apply the law as is. Thus, Given the frequent tendency for judges to indirectly become legislators, he warns that this mode of proceeding presupposes frequent violations of the Constitution that they have sworn to defend. Another topic extensively argued is the role of religion in public life. Although George prefers to make use of rational arguments in his defense of values (among them the protection of human life in all its instances, marriage as the union of a man and a woman open to life, or the defense of freedom, etc.), he makes it clear that religion has the right to participate in public life by contributing its knowledge and values in favor of the socio-political common good as many important figures have done in the history of United States. Hence, George does not advocate neutrality in the public sphere, nor does he support the opposite extreme: a “sacred public square”. He supports a society that is not only “civil” but also “civilized”, that is to say, a society in which every citizen can manifest his words and/or his ideas and beliefs in an ambiance of mutual respect. Such a society believes that every citizen not only has the right to think, to believe and to live according to his views, but also is able to give reasons for them, whether from a secular or religious perspective.