Abstract
The reform of section 14 of the corporation’s act was an inexplicable backward movement in corporate governance, as it modified the effect of the lack of registration of shareholders agreements which restrict the free tradeability of shares. This effect changed from absolute nullity to lack of efficacy. The understanding of how this reform impacts the corporate governance system, requires to relate three aspects: – the legal shaping of shareholder agreements in corporations and close corporations; – the different roles played by these agreements in the formers and – the grounds of corporate and capital market regulation in this regard. This work offers criteria to make this relation, from which is obtained as result that a systemic construction of corporate and capital markets rules, affords to elaborate a construction of the reform that is in accordance with the requirements of transparency and investor protection.
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