Abstract
With the revelation in 1972 of the Double-Cross System by J. C. Masterman,' followed two years later by the exposure of The Ultra Secret by F. W. Winterbotham,2 and in another four years R. V. Jones' revealing account of additional triumphs of the British intelligentsia over their German rivals in Most Secret War,3 the inevitable question became, 'Why didn't the Allies win the war sooner?' To which Harold Deutsch of the US Army War College has provided the proper answer: 'They did win the war sooner.'4 The question then becomes, how much sooner? And in that context, what role did Ultra in particular and the entire intelligence apparatus in general play in bringing about the victory? No exact answer can be given, but one profitable way to examine the problem is through the office of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force. How, when, and to what extent did he rely on intelligence in making his decisions? An additional question then presents itself: how good a spy-master was he?
Published Version
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